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JUDICIAL SUPREMACY IN A FEDERALISM CONTEXT THROUGH
THE LENS OF COOPER
Joel K. Goldstein*
I. INTRODUCTION
Cooper v. Aaron,1 the 1958 Supreme Court decision addressing the
Little Rock school desegregation controversy, is a significant decision in
American history. Justice Stephen Breyer has written, “The Little Rock
cases eventually helped to produce victory for the cause of racial
integration, a victory that helped secure the rule of law in America.”2
Unfortunately, even sixty years after Cooper it remains premature to declare
“victory” for racial integration as a description of American life. Contrary to
the premise and promise of Brown v. Board of Education,3 America still
operates in important ways as multiple, separate societies, not as an
indivisible nation where all enjoy liberty and justice. Yet Justice Breyer
surely is right that Cooper was an important milepost in the effort to make
state-sponsored racial segregation unlawful. Cooper signaled that the Court
would not accept mob violence as a reason to defer realization of
constitutional rights for a minority group, thereby reaffirming its
commitment to the rule of law. And Little Rock provided an occasion when
Northerners could see, courtesy of newly-developed technologies, “the
viciousness and brutality that was always latent in segregation,”4 thereby
shifting public opinion in support of Brown. Cooper was an important step
of America’s journey on a path which did not begin with Brown, but counts
it as a giant leap.
Notwithstanding its status as a landmark in America’s history
regarding race, doctrinally Cooper is not primarily a case about civil rights.
It is most significant for its discussion of, and claims regarding, the Supreme
Court’s role in American government and federalism. Cooper famously
*

Vincent C. Immel Professor of Law, Saint Louis University School of Law. Thanks to Dean
Theresa M. Beiner of the UA Little Rock William H. Bowen School of Law and the editors
of the University of Arkansas at Little Rock Law Review for their invitation to participate in
their symposium on Cooper v. Aaron and for their hospitality, and to the other participants
for the stimulating discussion they provided.
1. 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
2. STEPHEN BREYER, MAKING OUR DEMOCRACY WORK: A JUDGE’S VIEW 49 (2010).
3. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
4. David A. Strauss, Little Rock and the Legacy of Brown, 52 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1065,
1067 (2008).
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asserted as a basic constitutional principle that the Supreme Court is the
ultimate constitutional expositor.5 The Court relied on that precept in service
of its insistence that its then-recent decision in Brown, which declared racial
segregation in public schools unconstitutional,6 was the law of the land, that
the decision was not simply the Court’s interpretation of the Constitution but
what the Constitution meant and required, and that Brown constitutionally
bound not only the parties before it,7 but also federal and state officials in
non-party states like Arkansas as well.8 Whereas Brown was an opinion
about the unconstitutionality of racial segregation, Cooper focused more on
asserting judicial supremacy than on rejecting white supremacy.9 And it
traced the principle it decreed regarding the finality of the Court’s
constitutional decisions to Chief Justice John Marshall’s foundational
opinion in Marbury v. Madison.10
The Court was certainly on firm ground in demanding respect for
Brown, but Cooper’s claims regarding judicial supremacy misstated their
source, status, and strength. Marbury did not articulate the proposition of
judicial supremacy as the Court claimed, but a narrower principle regarding
the Court’s role as constitutional interpreter. Although the Court’s heavy
reliance on Marbury was misplaced, its claims regarding judicial supremacy
did find some support in other constitutional doctrine regarding the Court’s
role, especially in a federalism context. Yet what allowed the Court to assert
judicial supremacy was not so much the judicial doctrine consistent with its
claim, but the support national political actors, particularly President Dwight
D. Eisenhower and the Department of Justice, gave that principle in the
months leading up to Cooper. Eisenhower and his lieutenants repeatedly
defended the separate, but related, ideas that the Supreme Court’s
constitutional interpretations bound other officials and that the executive
branch was duty-bound to enforce federal court decisions. This support
fortified the Court by persuading it that it would not stand alone against
resisters. Even so, Eisenhower’s support was insufficient to enforce Brown.

5. 358 U.S. at 18 (“[T]he basic principle that the federal judiciary is supreme in the
exposition of the law of the Constitution. . . .”).
6. 347 U.S. 483. See generally Joel K. Goldstein, Approaches to Brown v. Board of
Education: Some Notes on Teaching a Seminal Case, 49 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 777 (2005).
7. Brown decided four cases involving “separate but equal” schools in the states of
Kansas, Delaware, South Carolina, and Virginia. See Brown, 347 U.S. at 486. A companion
case, Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954), addressed the constitutionality of the same
doctrine in the District of Columbia under the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.
8. Cooper, 358 U.S. 1.
9. Cf. Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV.
L. REV. 1, 22 (1959) (stating that the Court’s opinion in Cooper “deal[s], of course, with other
matters”).
10. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
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Unfortunately, that was a more complicated project, one not amenable to
resolution simply by judicial pronouncement and decree.
Especially in light of the Court’s reliance on Marbury, the comments
and role of Eisenhower and his administration in the Little Rock crisis
present something of an institutional and historical irony. The institutional
irony was that the Court’s ability in Cooper to claim judicial supremacy as
constitutional interpreter in a federalism context depended on public
acceptance of that ideal by leaders of other branches of American
government. Its claim was not self-executing, but rather required acceptance
by political actors, and others. And the historic irony was that even though
Cooper misattributed judicial supremacy to Marbury, the 1958 decision did
underscore an important lesson from that classic case. In Marbury, Chief
Justice John Marshall could not direct high executive officials to deliver a
commission to William Marbury because he feared they would disobey the
Court’s order.11 In Cooper, the Court could assert such a power because the
executive branch had prospectively signaled its agreement. Nonetheless,
even presidential support for the principle that the Court’s interpretations
were binding law was insufficient to allow the Court’s pronouncements
regarding school desegregation to be so treated. That project required
societal acceptance as well.
Appreciating the Court’s discussion of judicial supremacy requires
some understanding of the facts that gave rise to the case. Accordingly, this
article will begin with a rather lengthy sketch of the facts of Cooper and the
context in which it arose. Part III will present the Court’s judicial supremacy
assertion and demonstrate that the Court misstated Marbury and its lineage
in American history. Part IV will consider other theories that might justify
the Court’s claim of judicial supremacy in the federalism context Cooper
presented. Part V will recount the important support Eisenhower and his
administration gave judicial supremacy prior to the Court’s embrace of it
and its impact. Part VI will offer conclusions.
II. TO THE DECISION IN COOPER V. AARON
On May 17, 1954, the Supreme Court, in Brown v. Board of
Education,12 overturned the doctrine of “separate but equal” in public
education13 on the grounds that government-sanctioned racial segregation

11. See infra text accompanying notes 155–56.
12. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
13. Id. at 495 (“We conclude that in the field of public education, the doctrine of
‘separate but equal’ has no place. Separate educational facilities are inherently unequal.”).
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stamped African-American children as inferiors.14 The Court, however,
deferred imposing a remedy and invited further briefing on that subject
during its next term.15
Although Little Rock operated a segregated public school system,
neither it nor Arkansas had been a defendant in Brown. The Little Rock
School Board pledged to comply with Brown once the Supreme Court
provided guidance16 despite the School Board’s disagreement with the
decision.17 The Little Rock School Board directed school officials to prepare
a plan.18 Among Southern cities, Little Rock had a reputation for relative
racial moderation,19 and its initial attitude was consistent with the
disposition of some other Southern centrists who felt compelled to abide by
a Court decision notwithstanding their disagreement.20 Arkansas filed a brief
in Brown II promising to implement Brown.21 Shortly before the Court gave
its remedial guidance in Brown II, the Little Rock School Board made
public its plan to allow a few black students to attend Central High School
in 1957 with junior high school and elementary school integration beginning
roughly three and six years later, respectively.22 The Little Rock plan
allowed any student to attend a school where his or her race would be in the
majority, thereby assuring whites that they would be able to transfer from a
predominantly black school.23 The School Board’s initial response, modest
though it was, later shifted to accommodate segregationist attitudes it
encountered and School Board leaders privately reassured Little Rock’s
white community that school desegregation would occur as slowly as
possible.24

14. Id. at 494 (“To separate them from others of similar age and qualifications solely
because of their race generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community that
may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone.”).
15. Id. at 495–96.
16. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 7 (1958).
17. TONY A. FREYER, LITTLE ROCK ON TRIAL: COOPER V. AARON AND SCHOOL
DESEGREGATION 16 (2007); see Cooper, 358 U.S. at 7; Daniel A. Farber, The Supreme Court
and the Rule of Law: Cooper v. Aaron Revisited, 1982 U. ILL. L. Rev. 387, 391.
18. Cooper, 358 U.S. at 8.
19. Keith E. Whittington, The Court as the Final Arbiter of the Constitution: Cooper v.
Aaron (1958), in CREATING CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE: CLASHES OVER POWER AND LIBERTY
IN THE SUPREME COURT 9, 10 (Greg Ivers & Kevin T. McGuire eds., 2004); Farber, supra note
17, at 392; Strauss, supra note 4, at 1076; J. Harvie Wilkinson, III, Supreme Court and
Southern School Desegregation, 1955–1970: A History and Analysis, 64 VA. L. REV. 485, 516
(1978).
20. Farber, supra note 17, at 392.
21. FREYER, supra note 17, at 21–22.
22. Cooper, 358 U.S. at 7–8.
23. FREYER, supra note 17, at 27–28.
24. Id. at 23–24.
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At the Supreme Court, some Justices worried about issuing
unenforceable orders.25 As Corinna Barrett Lain has written, “Disobedience
of Supreme Court rulings reveals the Court’s weakness; it shows that the
emperor has no clothes and that the Supreme Court cannot, without help,
make anyone do much of anything. That, in turn, renders the Court
vulnerable to future disregard of its rulings.”26 These concerns of these
Justices were not unfounded. Some Southern states had refused to submit
briefs regarding implementation, suggesting a disposition to deny that the
ultimate decision would bind them.27 At oral argument, the South’s lead
attorney refused to commit to comply with a Supreme Court decision,
stating “we would not send our white children to the Negro schools,”28 a
position that seemed to undercut the fiction that the schools had been equal
as well as separate as Plessy v. Ferguson29 required.
At the recommendation of Attorney General Herbert Brownell, the
Eisenhower administration accepted the Supreme Court’s invitation to
participate in the briefing and argument of Brown.30 The Department of
Justice urged the Court to require school districts to submit desegregation
plans to the local supervising courts within ninety days,31 but the Court
accepted those recommendations only in part.32 In its May, 1955 decision
(Brown II),33 the Court imposed an obligation on local school districts, under
the supervision of the local federal or state courts, to begin to desegregate
schools “with all deliberate speed,”34 a formulation widely viewed as
accepting a gradual desegregation.35 Some Justices had worried that
requiring immediate desegregation would prompt defiance and hoped that a
show of judicial patience would induce good faith compliance.36
The hopes of the Justices were disappointed. Brown did not
immediately achieve its current iconic status in American constitutional law.
In fact, as David Strauss reminds us, some of its critics rejected it as “a
25. BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE: HOW PUBLIC OPINION HAS INFLUENCED
THE SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED THE MEANING OF THE CONSTITUTION 246–47 (2009).
26. Corinna Barrett Lain, Soft Supremacy, 58 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1609, 1658 (2017).
27. MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO
THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 314 (2004).
28. FRIEDMAN, supra note 25, at 246–47.

CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND

29. 163 U.S. 597 (1896).
30. HERBERT BROWNELL & JOHN BURKE, ADVISING IKE: THE MEMOIRS OF ATTORNEY
GENERAL HERBERT BROWNELL 190–91 (1993).
31. BREYER, supra note 2, at 51 (summarizing Attorney General Herbert Brownell’s
briefs); BROWNELL & BURKE, supra note 30, at 197.
32. BREYER, supra note 2, at 51; BROWNELL & BURKE, supra note 30, at 197.
33. Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown II), 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955).
34. Id.
35. See, e.g., SETH STERN & STEPHEN WERMIEL, JUSTICE BRENNAN: LIBERAL CHAMPION
141 (2010) (“[Brown II] seemed to put the brakes on rapid school desegregation.”).
36. FREYER, supra note 17, at 14.
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lawless act of judicial usurpation.”37 Many Southern states reacted defiantly.
About 100 Southern members of Congress signed a Southern Manifesto in
March 1956 which decried the Court’s decisions in Brown I and II as “a
clear abuse of judicial power” and insisted that the Plessy v. Ferguson38
doctrine of “separate but equal,” which was nearly a century old, correctly
construed the Equal Protection Clause.39 The signatories pledged “to use all
lawful means to bring about a reversal of this decision which is contrary to
the Constitution and to prevent the use of force in its implementation”;40
although, as the distinguished legal historian Tony A. Freyer pointed out,
the meaning of “lawful” was ambiguous.41 Arkansas’s two senators, John
McClellan and J. William Fulbright, were among the nineteen senators who
signed as did all six members of the House of Representatives from
Arkansas, including the moderate Brook Hays.42 Arkansas Governor Orval
E. Faubus had been elected as something of a racial moderate in 1954, yet
over time embraced increasingly extreme segregationist positions apparently
to advance his political career.43
Frustrated by the gradual approach of the Little Rock School Board, the
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), on
behalf of thirty-three African-American children, filed suit against the Little
Rock School District in federal court on February 8, 1956.44 The case drew
its name from John Aaron, the first plaintiff, and Dr. William G. Cooper, the
School Board President.45 In August 1956, the federal district court upheld
the School Board’s minimalistic plan,46 and the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed that decision.47
Whereas the NAACP sought to expedite integration, the Little Rock
Citizens Council, consistent with the Southern pattern elsewhere, sought to
37. Strauss, supra note 4, at 1066; see also Charles J. Bloch, The School Segregation
Cases: A Legal Error That Should Be Corrected, 45 A.B.A. J. 27, 98 (1959) (arguing that the
Supreme Court lacked power in Brown to declare its decision as the “law of the land”); id.
(denying that Brown could “irrevocably fix[]” government policy regarding non-party states);
id. (denying that Brown was the law of the land).
38. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
39. 102 CONG. REC. 4459–61 (1956).
40. Id. at 4460.
41. FREYER, supra note 17, at 8; see also Recent Attacks upon the Supreme Court: A
Statement by Members of the Bar, 42 A.B.A. 1128, 1128 (1956) (calling formulation
appealing for “‘resistance’ to decisions of the Court ‘by any lawful means’” as a selfcontradiction and ambiguous).
42. 102 CONG. REC. 4460 (1956).
43. FREYER, supra note 17, at 8; Strauss, supra note 4, at 1077; Wilkinson, supra note
19, at 515–17.
44. FREYER, supra note 17, at 34.
45. Id. at 34–35.
46. Aaron v. Cooper, 143 F. Supp. 855 (E.D. Ark. 1956).
47. Aaron v. Cooper, 243 F.2d. 361 (8th Cir. 1957).
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prevent it.48 Amis Guthridge, working with gubernatorial candidate and
arch-segregationist James Johnson, denied the legitimacy of Brown and
adopted states’ rights rhetoric as code to perpetuate apartheid and to resist
integration.49 The Council’s multi-faceted strategy included proposing
legislation to strip the federal courts of jurisdiction over civil rights cases,
intimidating blacks from voting, pushing Faubus to oppose integration, and
threatening and using violence.50 Johnson unsuccessfully challenged Faubus
in the Democratic primary in 1956, but the so-called Johnson interposition
amendment to the Arkansas Constitution, which required adoption of
measures to frustrate Brown, passed in the November election,51 and the
electoral challenge also pushed Faubus towards segregationist policies.52 In
particular, the referendum amended the state constitution directing the
Arkansas State Legislature to resist “in every Constitutional manner the
Unconstitutional desegregation decisions of May 17, 1954, and May 31,
1955, of the United States Supreme Court[.]”53 The state legislature
responded by passing laws relieving children from compulsory attendance at
racially mixed schools, and establishing a State Sovereignty Commission.54
Although President Dwight D. Eisenhower stated his unequivocal
belief in his post-presidential memoir that Brown was correctly decided,55 he
never publicly endorsed the decision as President.56 He later explained that
he had refused to state publicly his view on that Supreme Court decision
because he did not wish to set a precedent since he thought that if he ever
expressed disagreement with an opinion that action would erode public
confidence in his willingness to enforce it.57 Brownell regarded Eisenhower
as a “strong supporter of states’ rights” who was disinclined to be a
“crusader” for civil rights but who had “strong views” regarding the need to
enforce law and his “deep respect” for the Constitution and the duties it
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

BREYER, supra note 2, at 52–54.
FREYER, supra note 17, at 36–38.
Id. at 39–40.
Id. at 69.
Id. at 64–67; Strauss, supra note 4, at 1077.
Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 8–9 (1958).
Id. at 9.
DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER, MANDATE FOR CHANGE: 1953–1956, at 229–30 (1963);
DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER, WAGING PEACE, 1957–1961, at 150 (1965) [hereinafter WAGING
PEACE].
56. KLARMAN, supra note 27, at 324; cf. BROWNELL & BURKE, supra note 30, at 197–98
(describing Eisenhower’s action in correcting the draft Republican platform in 1956 to point
out that he had not taken a stand on Brown).
57. WAGING PEACE, supra note 55, at 150; see also The President’s News Conference of
September 5, 1956, 1956 PUB. PAPERS 732, 737 (Sept. 5, 1956) (“I think it makes no
difference whether or not I endorse [Brown]. The Constitution is as the Supreme Court
interprets it; and I must conform to that and do my very best to see that it is carried out in this
country.”).

168

UA LITTLE ROCK LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41

imposed on the President.58 Others construed Eisenhower’s behavior as
signaling a “general dislike” for the decision.59 Eisenhower had made
inroads into the South and Border States in 1952 and hoped to expand his
support in those regions in 1956.
After the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
affirmed the Little Rock gradualist program, the Little Rock schools
proceeded to prepare for a few black students to begin attending Central
High School in September 1957.60 In response to opposition from leaders of
the Citizens Council, the Little Rock School Board reaffirmed its
disagreement with Brown but deemed itself committed to follow it based on
the Supremacy Clause and the federal court decisions.61 Faubus, too, had
initially conceded publicly that federal laws prevailed over state laws.62 As
the school year approached, however, the Central High Mothers’ League
mobilized to oppose the inclusion of nine African-American students at
Central High.63 One of its leaders proclaimed that the loss of state autonomy
Brown involved would cost “everything that has made America a great and
Christian nation.”64 Faubus spent time with segregationists who suggested
that integration would adversely affect his re-election prospects in 1958.65
Faubus connived to have Mothers’ League personnel file a state court
lawsuit seeking to enjoin the desegregation plan to avert threatened
violence.66 Although Faubus testified to the likelihood of violence, various
Little Rock School Board and police officials contested his prediction.67
Nonetheless, the state judge, who Faubus had appointed, granted the
injunction on August 29, 1957.68 The Little Rock School Board then asked
58. BROWNELL & BURKE, supra note 30, at 190.
59. See, e.g., FREYER, supra note 17, at 11; see also RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE
753 (1975) (criticizing President Eisenhower for not publicly supporting Brown); ROBERT G.
MCCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT 217 (1960) (stating that Eisenhower’s “moral
support” for Brown “which might have helped to muster obedience, was accorded too
grudgingly and tardily to do much good”); Frederic M. Bloom, Cooper’s Quiet Demise:(A
Short Response to Professor Strauss), 52 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1115, 1119 (2008) (calling
Eisenhower “at best an ambivalent supporter of Brown”); cf. Farber, supra note 17, at 394 &
n.65 (stating that Eisenhower’s views on Brown were “unclear” and that there was “some
evidence” he opposed it). But see LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
AMERICAN ELITE, 1789–2008, at 246 (2009) (rejecting the idea that Eisenhower opposed
Brown).
60. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 8–9 (1958).
61. FREYER, supra note 17, at 80–81.
62. Id. at 95.
63. Id. at 95–97.
64. Id. at 97.
65. Id. at 95–96.
66. Id. at 105.
67. FREYER, supra note 17, at 105.
68. Id. at 104–06; see BREYER, supra note 2, at 55.
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the federal court to quash the state-court issued injunction which it did the
following day.69 The School Board later blamed Faubus for intensifying
opposition to its desegregation plan and encouraging the hope that Arkansas
had constitutional power to defy Brown.70
A few days later, Faubus dispatched the Arkansas National Guard to
Central High School without any request from school officials.71 In a
televised speech on September 2, 1957, Faubus said that recent events had
left most Arkansas citizens doubtful that Brown bound the state.72 Moreover,
he stated that he was bound by the November 1956 interposition measures
and subsequent acts the state legislature had adopted.73 Uncertainty
regarding whether Brown or the Arkansas laws were supreme had
contributed to a climate of imminent disorder.74 The troops would not act as
“segregationists or integrationists” but that since “forcible integration”
would interfere with law and order the public schools would operate “for the
time being” as they had traditionally,75 in other words, on a segregationist
basis. The Little Rock School Board then publicly asked the nine AfricanAmerican students not to attend Central High School until the legal dispute
was resolved.76 None sought to attend on September 3, 1957.77 The district
court held a hearing that day in response to the School Board’s request for
instructions, and determined that the state’s positioning of troops at Central
High was not a reason to depart from the approved plan to desegregate the
school.78
On September 4, 1957, the nine African-American students sought to
enter Central High, but the Arkansas National Guard and a hostile mob
prevented them from going to school.79 One student, Elizabeth Eckford,
69. Whittington, supra note 19, at 12. The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
upheld the decision. Thomason v. Cooper, 254 F.2d. 808, 811 (8th Cir. 1958).
70. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 10 (1958) (“The Board’s petition for postponement in
this proceeding states: ‘The effect of that action [of the Governor] was to harden the core of
opposition to the Plan and cause many persons who theretofore had reluctantly accepted the
Plan to believe there was some power in the State of Arkansas which, when exerted, could
nullify the Federal law and permit disobedience of the decree of this [District] Court, and,
from that date, hostility to the Plan was increased, and criticism of the officials of the
[School] District has become more bitter and unrestrained.’”).
71. Id. at 9.
72. FREYER, supra note 17, at 113.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Whittington, supra note 19, at 12–13.
76. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 10 (1958); Whittington, supra note 19, at 13.
77. Whittington, supra note 19, at 13.
78. Cooper, 358 U.S. at 10–11.
79. Id. at 11 (“On the morning of the next day, September 4, 1957, the Negro children
attempted to enter the high school, but, as the District Court later found, units of the Arkansas
National Guard, ‘acting pursuant to the Governor’s order, stood shoulder to shoulder at the
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became separated from the others and was taunted with vicious racial
epithets by angry whites; a photograph capturing the ugly scene was
transmitted internationally.80
The federal district court then asked the federal government to
intervene in the case and to investigate whether Faubus had interfered with
the district court’s order.81 The Little Rock School Board requested a delay
of desegregation, which the federal court denied on September 7, 1957.82
In acknowledging receipt of Faubus’s telegram regarding the crisis,
Eisenhower responded on September 5, 1957, “When I became President, I
took an oath to support and defend the Constitution of the United States.
The only assurance I can give you is that the Federal Constitution will be
upheld by me by every legal means at my command.”83 Eisenhower denied
that the federal government was considering arresting Faubus or had tapped
his phone and expressed confidence that Faubus and other Arkansas
officials, including the National Guard would “give full cooperation to the
United States District Court.”84
Faubus requested a meeting with Eisenhower,85 and, with
Representative Brooks Hays of Arkansas serving as an intermediary,
Eisenhower and Faubus met during the President’s vacation in Newport,
Rhode Island.86 Eisenhower sought to persuade Faubus that he could not
prevail in a contest with the national government and asked him to have the
National Guard protect the African-American students, not prevent them
from attending school.87 Faubus expressed recognition that federal law
prevailed over contrary state law and left Eisenhower with the impression
that he would accede to his requests,88 but he was less agreeable before
cameras. Eisenhower reported that Faubus had said he would honor federal

school grounds and thereby forcibly prevented the 9 Negro students . . . from entering,’ as
they continued to do every school day during the following three weeks.”).
80. BREYER, supra note 2, at 56; FREYER, supra note 17, at 115.
81. Cooper, 358 U.S. at 11.
82. Id.
83. Telegram to the Governor of Arkansas in Response to His Request for Assurance
Regarding His Action at Little Rock, 1957 PUB. PAPERS 659, 659 (Sept. 5, 1957) [hereinafter
Telegram on Assurance to the Governor].
84. Id.
85. Telegram to the Governor of Arkansas in Response to His Request for a Meeting,
1957 PUB. PAPERS 673 (Sept. 11, 1957).
86. WAGING PEACE, supra note 55, at 166.
87. Dwight D. Eisenhower, Diary, EISENHOWER ARCHIVES (Oct. 8, 1957), https://www.
eisenhower.archives.gov/research/online_documents/civil_rights_little_rock/1957_10_08_Di
ary_Notes_Faubus_Meeting.pdf.
88. Id.
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court orders89 and expressed confidence that Faubus would comply with the
supreme law of the land.90
Eisenhower’s confidence was misplaced. At a federal court argument
on September 20, 1957, Faubus’s representatives opposed the federal
government’s request for an injunction and questioned the court’s
jurisdiction.91 When the court rejected Faubus’s jurisdictional arguments, the
State’s attorneys left the hearing.92 The federal court issued an injunction
against Faubus and officers of the Arkansas National Guard and directed
them to enforce, not seek to nullify, the court’s order.93 Faubus then
withdrew the Arkansas National Guard.94 Eisenhower issued a statement
acknowledging that local law enforcement authorities were prepared to
maintain law and order as the School Board proceeded with its
desegregation plan,95 called for a “sympathetic understanding of the ordeal”
of the African-American students and praised the “dignity and . . . restraint”
they and their parents had demonstrated,96 and expressed confidence that
citizens of Little Rock and Arkansas “will welcome this opportunity to
demonstrate that in their city and in their state proper orders of a United
States Court will be executed promptly and without disorder.”97
Once again, Eisenhower proved overly optimistic in his expectations or
exhortations, whichever they were. Although the nine African-American
students finally entered Central High on September 23, 1957 under the
protection of the Little Rock Police Department and other law enforcement
despite the presence of a large, hostile mob, officials thought the situation
precarious and sent them home early.98 Eisenhower issued an angry
statement about the “disgraceful occurrences” at Central High School and in
Little Rock, in which he asserted that federal law and court orders could not
be “flouted with impunity by any individual or any mob of extremists,”
89. Statement by the President Following a Meeting with the Governor of Arkansas,
1957 PUB. PAPERS 674, 674 (Sept. 14, 1957) [hereinafter President’s Statement After Meeting
with Governor] (“The Governor stated his intention to respect the decisions of the United
States District Court and to give his full cooperation in carrying out his responsibilities in
respect to these decisions. In so doing, I recognize the inescapable responsibility resting upon
the Governor to preserve law and order in his state.”).
90. Id. at 674–75 (“I am sure it is the desire of the Governor not only to observe the
supreme law of the land but to use the influence of his office in orderly progress of the plans
which are already the subject of the order of the Court.”).
91. FREYER, supra note 17, at 122; see also Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 11–12 (1958).
92. Id.
93. Cooper, 358 U.S. at 11–12; Aaron v. Cooper, 156 F. Supp. 220 (E.D. Ark. 1957).
94. Cooper, 358 U.S. at 12.
95. Statement by the President on the Developments at Little Rock, 1957 PUB. PAPERS
678 (Sept. 21, 1957).
96. Id. at 679.
97. Id.
98. Cooper, 358 U.S. at 12.
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pledged to use necessary force “to prevent any obstruction of the law and to
carry out” federal court orders,” and implored “every right thinking citizen”
to hope that “the American sense of justice and fair play will prevail in this
case” since “[i]t will be a sad day for this country—both at home and
abroad—if school children can safely attend their classes only under the
protection of armed guards.”99 Eisenhower expressed “confidence” that
“citizens of Little Rock and of Arkansas will respect the law and will not
countenance violations of law and order by extremists.”100 He also issued a
presidential proclamation finding that “certain persons in the State of
Arkansas, individually and in unlawful assemblages, combinations, and
conspiracies ha[d] willfully obstructed the enforcement of [federal court]
orders” and that “such obstruction of justice constitutes a denial of the equal
protection of the laws secured by the Constitution of the United States” and
accordingly commanded all such persons to cease and desist from such
behavior and to disperse.101
At this point, President Eisenhower reinforced his words with dramatic
action. He nationalized the Arkansas National Guard and directed the
Secretary of Defense to dispatch federal troops to Little Rock to enforce the
federal court orders regarding the desegregation of Central High School.102
On September 24, 1957, aircraft carrying roughly one thousand troops of the
101st Airborne Division of the United States Army arrived in Little Rock.103
Eisenhower returned to the White House to address the nation by
television and radio on the Little Rock crisis. In his speech, Eisenhower
repeatedly explained that his obligation as President to enforce federal court
orders compelled his decision to send federal troops to Little Rock.104 Since

99. Statement by the President Regarding Occurrences at Central High School in Little
Rock, 1957 PUB. PAPERS 689, 689 (Sept. 23, 1957).
100. Id.
101. Proclamation No. 3204, 22 Fed. Reg. 7628 (Sept. 23, 1957).
102. Exec. Order No. 10730, 22 Fed. Reg. 7628 (Sept. 23, 1957).
103. FREYER, supra note 17, at 130–31.
104. Radio and Television Address to the American People on the Situation in Little
Rock, 1957 PUB. PAPERS 689, 690 (Sept. 24, 1957) [hereinafter Radio and TV Address] (“[I]n
the action I was compelled today to take and the firmness with which I intend to pursue this
course until the orders of the Federal Court at Little Rock can be executed without unlawful
interference.”); id. (“Whenever normal agencies prove inadequate to the task and it becomes
necessary for the Executive Branch of the Federal Government to use its powers and
authority to uphold Federal Courts, the President’s responsibility is inescapable.”); id. at 691
(“But when large gatherings of obstructionists made it impossible for the decrees of
the Court to be carried out, both the law and the national interest demanded that the President
take action.”); id. at 693 (“The proper use of the powers of the Executive Branch to enforce
the orders of a Federal Court is limited to extraordinary and compelling circumstances.”); id.
at 694 (“If resistance to the Federal Court orders ceases at once, the further presence of
Federal troops will be unnecessary and the City of Little Rock will return to its normal habits
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“under the leadership of demagogic extremists, disorderly mobs have
deliberately prevented the carrying out of proper orders from a Federal
Court” and local authorities had not “eliminated that violent opposition,” the
President’s “responsibility” had become “inescapable.”105 Although some
Southern cities had proceeded in accordance with Brown, thereby
demonstrating to the world that America was a nation subject to law,106
agitators in Little Rock had defied law. Presidential action was necessary to
protect individual liberty and security. “The very basis of our individual
rights and freedoms rests upon the certainty that the President and the
Executive Branch of Government will support and insure the carrying out of
the decisions of the Federal Courts, even, when necessary with all the means
at the President’s command[,]” Eisenhower said.107 Eisenhower reminded
the country that the Supreme Court had held that “separate public
educational facilities for the races are inherently unequal and therefore
compulsory school segregation laws are unconstitutional.”108 That decision
settled the constitutional question, Eisenhower suggested.109 “Our personal
opinions about the decision have no bearing on the matter of enforcement;
the responsibility and authority of the Supreme Court to interpret the
Constitution are very clear.”110 The following day, the federal troops
escorted the nine African-American students into Central High School.111
The experience of the nine students during the next months was “not a
happy one.”112 White students subjected their African-American classmates
to violence and harassment and the school had to deal with bomb threats and
other acts of vandalism and terror, threatened or actual.113 In early 1958, the
Little Rock School Board asked the federal district court to delay integration
by thirty months.114 It attributed the request to the difficulty of operating the
schools given the hostility of the governor, state legislature, and community
and to allow courts to consider the legality of state measures challenging
Brown.115 The district court granted the School Board’s request in June
1958,116 but the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed two months
of peace and order and a blot upon the fair name and high honor of our nation in the world
will be removed.”).
105. Id. at 690.
106. Id. at 691.
107. Id. at 692.
108. Id. at 690.
109. Id. at 690–91.
110. Radio and TV Address, supra note 104, at 690.
111. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 12 (1958).
112. Wilkinson, supra note 19, at 518.
113. Id.; see Farber, supra note 17, at 396.
114. Cooper, 358 U.S. at 12–13.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 13.
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later in mid-August 1958.117 The Supreme Court agreed to hear an appeal in
the case.118 That in itself was significant since the Court had refused to
accept other school desegregation cases after Brown. In fact, other than
Brown, Cooper was the only such case the Court heard until 1963.119
In different ways, the briefs before the Supreme Court raised the issue
regarding the binding effect of Brown. The Little Rock School Board argued
that it had attempted in good faith to comply with Brown I and II but had
been precluded from doing so due to widespread public opposition and
violence and resistance by officials of all branches of Arkansas’s
government.120 Indeed, the Arkansas legislature had recently passed bills
awaiting Faubus’s action to allow the governor to close schools to avoid
integration, to allow students to transfer to segregated schools or to attend
segregated classes, and to recall School Board members who complied with
Brown.121 The situation confronting the Little Rock School Board involved
“massive resistance to and defiance of a constitutional principle running
counter to the mores of the people.”122 Popular public officials had
encouraged Arkansas citizens to pursue “a steady course of absolute
nonrecognition of the validity of the Brown decisions, usually on the
premise that they are unconstitutional.”123 Since “thousands of school
districts” in the South had done nothing to comply with Brown, “it would be
the height of irony” if Little Rock’s schools, “having made the start in good
faith,” were denied a delay “at the expense of the entire educational program
at the high school level.”124
In their simultaneous submission, the respondent characterized the
question before the Court as “a national test of the vitality of the principle
enunciated in Brown”125 and as involving “not only vindication of the
constitutional rights declared in Brown, but indeed the very survival of the

117. Id.
118. Id. at 14.
119. KLARMAN, supra note 27, at 324.
120. Brief for the Petitioners at 3–4, 6, Cooper, 358 U.S. 1 (No. 1, 1958 Aug. Special
Term), reprinted in 54 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
UNITED STATES: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 558–559, 561 (Philip B. Kurland & Gerhard Casper
eds., 1975) [hereinafter LANDMARK BRIEFS].
121. Id. at 16–17, reprinted in LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 120, at 571–72.
122. Id. at 27, reprinted in LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 120, at 582.
123. Id., reprinted in LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 120, at 582; see also id, reprinted in
LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 120, at 582. (“The people have been told repeatedly by high
officials, nationally syndicated columnists and others that the Brown decisions are not ‘the
law of the land’.”).
124. Id. at 7–8, reprinted in LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 120, at 562–63.
125. Brief for Respondents at 4, Cooper, 358 U.S. 1 (No. 1, 1958 Aug. Special Term),
reprinted in LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 120, at 602.
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Rule of Law” including “the supremacy of all constitutional rights over
bigots—big and small.”126
During oral argument, the question of the status of Brown became more
prominent. The counsel for the Little Rock School Board repeatedly
suggested that actions by state officials had created uncertainty regarding
whether Brown was constitutional and that these doubts had encouraged
public resistance,127 which might be resolved by state court decisions finding
various Arkansas interposition measures unconstitutional.128 The School
Board’s attorney said that the case went beyond problems raised by “lawless
mobs” to “the conflict of two sovereignties: the State and Federal
Governments”129 and raised the “essential issue[]” of the “refusal of a State
government to accept the validity of a Federal court decision as being the
law.”130
As attorney for the children, Thurgood Marshall responded that it was
“one thing” for a state politician to express disagreement with a Court
decision but “it’s another thing for a lawyer to stand up in this Court and
argue that there is any doubt about it” which is “where we are in this
case.”131 Marshall argued that he could not imagine “any more horrible
destruction of principle of citizenship” than to signal white children that
they could “violate the law and defy the lawful authorities” yet prevail.132 In
closing, Marshall said Cooper involved the “narrow question” of whether a
federal district court could delay a desegregation plan in progress “solely
because of violence and threats of violence.”133 In calling for a negative
answer, he asked that the Court deliver that response “in such a fashion as to
make it clear even to the politicians in Arkansas that Article VI of the
Constitution means what it says.”134
Similarly, J. Lee Rankin, the United States Solicitor General, argued
that the Supremacy Clause made Brown the supreme law of the land135 and
the Oath Clause made it binding on federal and state officials.136 The Little
Rock School Board should “carry out the obligations of the Constitution of
126. Id. at 5, reprinted in LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 120, at 603.
127. Transcript of Oral Argument at 14–15, 17–19, 30, 52, Cooper, 358 U.S. 1 (No. 1,
1958 Aug. Special Term), reprinted in LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 120, at 679–80, 682–
84, 695, 717.
128. Id. at 14–15, reprinted in LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 120, at 679–80.
129. Id. at 42–43, reprinted in LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 120, at 707–08.
130. Id. at 43, reprinted in LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 120, at 708.
131. Id. at 46, reprinted in LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 120, at 711.
132. Id. at 48–49, reprinted in LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 120, at 713–14.
133. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 127, at 52, reprinted in LANDMARK BRIEFS,
supra note 120, at 717.
134. Id., reprinted in LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 120, at 717.
135. Id. at 59, reprinted in LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 120, at 724.
136. Id. at 60, reprinted in LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 120, at 725.
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the United States as interpreted by this Court.”137 Rankin said that the Little
Rock schools should educate “the people that this Supreme Court has
spoken, that’s the law of the land; it’s binding; we’ve got to do it,” and that
their duty as citizens was “to obey the law and to support the
Constitution.”138
In its opinion, the Supreme Court accepted the lower court’s findings
that the School Board, the School Superintendent, and counsel had acted in
good faith and that the events in Little Rock had impeded the educational
progress of all students.139 The Court considered these findings:
[I]n light of the fact, indisputably revealed by the record . . . that the
conditions they depict are directly traceable to the actions of legislators
and executive officials of the State of Arkansas, taken in their official
capacities, which reflect their own determination to resist this Court’s
decision in the Brown case and which have brought about violent
resistance to that decision in Arkansas.140

Whereas Cooper came to the Court as a case about the integration of
the Little Rock public schools pursuant to the Equal Protection Clause, the
Court characterized it differently. Brown had already held that statemandated segregation in public education was unconstitutional.141 The issue
in Cooper was Brown’s status. Thus, the Court framed Cooper as raising
fundamental issues of federalism and separation of powers, not primarily as
a case about desegregation. The opinion, signed by all nine Justices as coauthors, began:
As this case reaches us, it raises questions of the highest importance to
the maintenance of our federal system of government. It necessarily
involves a claim by the Governor and Legislature of a State that there is
no duty on state officials to obey federal court orders resting on this
Court’s considered interpretation of the United States Constitution.
Specifically, it involves actions by the Governor and Legislature of
Arkansas upon the premise that they are not bound by our holding
in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U. S. 483. That holding was that
the Fourteenth Amendment forbids States to use their governmental
powers to bar children on racial grounds from attending schools where
there is state participation through any arrangement, management, funds
or property. We are urged to uphold a suspension of the Little Rock
School Board’s plan to do away with segregated public schools in Little
Rock until state laws and efforts to upset and nullify our holding
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.

Id., reprinted in LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 120, at 725.
Id. at 61, reprinted in LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 120, at 726.
Cooper, 358 U.S. at 15.
Id.
Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
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in Brown v. Board of Education have been further challenged and tested
in the courts. We reject these contentions. 142

The Court spent most of its twenty-page opinion summarizing the
procedural history and facts of the case including the lower court’s findings
that actions of state executive and legislative officials had created conditions
that led the Little Rock School Board to seek to delay desegregation.143 The
Court pointed out that the actions of state executive and legislative officials
constituted state action in violation of the Equal Protection Clause from
which the Little Rock School Board could not disassociate itself
notwithstanding its good faith.144 The Court wrote:
[T]he constitutional rights of children not to be discriminated against in
school admission on grounds of race or color declared by this Court in
the Brown case can neither be nullified openly and directly by state
legislators or state executive or judicial officers nor nullified indirectly
by them through evasive schemes for segregation whether attempted
“ingeniously or ingenuously.” 145

“What has been said, in the light of the facts developed, is enough to
dispose of the case,” the Court declared as it neared the end of page
seventeen of its twenty-page opinion.146 Yet the Court did not want to stop
without “answer[ing] the premise of the actions of the Governor and
Legislature that they are not bound by our holding in the Brown case,” an
answer it said required “only to recall some basic constitutional propositions
which are settled doctrine.”147
III. THE JUDICIAL SUPREMACY ARGUMENT
A.

The Argument in Cooper

In the closing passages of its opinion in Cooper, the Supreme Court
asserted that the Constitution made the Supreme Court the ultimate
expositor of the Constitution. In the familiar language the nine Justices as
co-authors, wrote in pertinent part:
Article VI of the Constitution makes the Constitution the “supreme Law
of the Land.” In 1803, Chief Justice Marshall, speaking for a unanimous
Court, referring to the Constitution as “the fundamental and paramount
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.

Cooper, 358 U.S. 1.
Id. at 4–15.
Id. at 15–16.
Id. at 17.
Id.
Id.
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law of the nation,” declared in the notable case of Marbury v. Madison, 1
Cranch 137, 5 U. S. 177, that “It is emphatically the province and duty of
the judicial department to say what the law is.” This decision declared
the basic principle that the federal judiciary is supreme in the exposition
of the law of the Constitution, and that principle has ever since been
respected by this Court and the Country as a permanent and
indispensable feature of our constitutional system. It follows that the
interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment enunciated by this Court in
the Brown case is the supreme law of the land, and Art. VI of the
Constitution makes it of binding effect on the States “any Thing in the
Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.”
Every state legislator and executive and judicial officer is solemnly
committed by oath taken pursuant to Art. VI, cl. 3 “to support this
Constitution.”148

The first sentence accurately summarized part of the Supremacy
Clause, and the second sentence correctly quoted Marbury. Those two
sentences provided foundation for the third sentence which proclaimed, and
attributed to Marbury, the doctrine of judicial supremacy in constitutional
interpretation (“This decision declared the basic principle that the federal
judiciary is supreme in the exposition of the law of the Constitution, and that
principle has ever since been respected by this Court and the Country as a
permanent and indispensable feature of our constitutional system.”). The
fourth sentence asserted that the Court’s interpretation of the Fourteenth
Amendment in Brown was the supreme law of the land notwithstanding
anything in state law.
The Justices surely thought that invoking Marbury strengthened their
contention that the Court’s opinion in Brown bound Governor Faubus, the
Arkansas State Legislature, and other Arkansas officials rather than leaving
them free to follow their own constitutional interpretations. But Marbury did
not really say what Cooper said it did, and the principle of judicial
supremacy was not nearly as well-established as the Court claimed.
B.

The Mistaken Reliance on Marbury

The particulars of Marbury are familiar,149 perhaps painfully so, to law
students everywhere. Following the Federalists’ defeat in the 1800
presidential election, the lame-duck Federalist Congress had created
additional federal judgeships which outgoing President John Adams could
fill with co-partisans before Thomas Jefferson and his loyalists took control
148. Cooper, 358 U.S. at 18.
149. See generally LARRY KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES 116–22 (2004); 4 DUMAS
MALONE, JEFFERSON THE PRESIDENT: FIRST TERM, 1801–1805, at 143–49 (1970); William W.
Van Alstyne, A Critical Guide to Marbury v. Madison, 1969 DUKE L.J. 1, 3–6.
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of the national legislative and executive branches.150 In abbreviated form,
William Marbury was among those Adams nominated and the Senate
confirmed as a Justice of the Peace for the District of Columbia in the
closing hours of the Adams presidency, but although Adams signed
Marbury’s commission and Secretary of State John Marshall affixed the seal
of the United States to it, thereby authenticating Adams’s John Hancock,
Marbury and a few others did not receive their commissions before Adams’s
term ended.151 Jefferson directed his new Secretary of State, James Madison,
not to deliver some commissions, including Marbury’s.152 Meanwhile,
during the last weeks of Adams’s term, the ubiquitous Marshall was
installed as Chief Justice, having been nominated by Adams and confirmed
by the Senate.153 Marbury sought a writ of mandamus from the Supreme
Court under section 13 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 to direct Madison to
deliver his commission.154
Marshall and his judicial colleagues were in a bind. They feared that
Jefferson would defy a Court order directing Madison to deliver the
commissions, recognized that the Court would be powerless to compel
compliance, and worried that such a scenario would reveal the Court’s
frailty, undermine its future utility, and perhaps prompt repercussions
against some of its members.155 Those consequences might be avoided by
concluding that the Court could never assert jurisdiction over a high
executive officer, a course that would mollify Jefferson but would create
doctrine crippling the Court.156
Instead, Marshall devised a judicial strategy that allowed him to score
doctrinal and political points while avoiding an unwinnable confrontation
with Jefferson and Madison.157 Marshall concluded that Marbury was
entitled to the commission that Jefferson and Madison wrongfully
withheld158 and that federal courts could assert jurisdiction over high
executive officials like Madison in cases where an individual claimed that
the federal official had violated a legal duty to him or her.159 These
150. Van Alstyne, supra note 149, at 3–6.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 3.
154. Id. at 3–6.
155. See, e.g., Lain, supra note 26, at 1658 (pointing out that disobedience to judicial
rulings imperils the Court’s legitimacy and makes its future work similarly vulnerable).
156. See generally ARCHIBALD COX, THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN
GOVERNMENT 10 (1976); KRAMER, supra note 149, at 122–23; MCCLOSKEY, supra note 59, at
41 (describing the “painful and unpromising dilemma” facing Marshall and the Court).
157. See generally JOHN B. ATTANASIO & JOEL K. GOLDSTEIN, UNDERSTANDING
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 23–30 (4th ed. 2012); MCCLOSKEY, supra note 59, at 40–44.
158. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 162 (1803).
159. Id. at 166, 168.

180

UA LITTLE ROCK LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41

conclusions were mere dicta, however, because the Court determined that in
this instance it could not issue such an order because section 13, as Marshall
interpreted it, attempted to give the Court original subject matter jurisdiction
over a case in which the Constitution gave the Supreme Court only appellate
subject matter jurisdiction.160
Much could and has been said about Marshall’s reasoning, but this
article is not the place for an extended discussion. Marbury, of course,
established several important constitutional principles: the Constitution is
paramount law; our system is one in which government and governing
institutions have limited powers conferred and confined by law; officials are
accountable to law and to democratic judgments; and the judiciary has the
power of judicial review, i.e., to interpret law which arises in a case or
controversy before it and to determine whether a statute is consistent with
the Constitution and, if it is not, to refuse to apply it.161
But Marbury did not say that the Court was the ultimate constitutional
interpreter.162 The statements it made (“It is emphatically the province and
duty of the Judicial Department to say what the law is.”163), and on which
Cooper relied in part, alone and especially when read in context, fell short of
declaring “the basic principle that the federal judiciary is supreme in the
exposition of the law of the Constitution.”164 Rather than make that claim,
Marshall made the more modest assertion that the Court could interpret the
Constitution to decide a case, and in doing so, could declare a law
unconstitutional and accordingly refuse to give it effect.165
160. Id. at 175–76.
161. ATTANASIO & GOLDSTEIN, supra note 157, at 30.
162. See also KRAMER, supra note 149, at 125–27 (arguing that Marbury did not assert
judicial exclusivity or judicial supremacy); id. at 221 (stating that Marbury did not declare
principle of judicial supremacy); WILLIAM E. NELSON, MARBURY V. MADISON: THE ORIGINS
AND LEGACY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 95 (2d ed. 2018) (“They had no intention to behave as the
Supreme Court ultimately would in Cooper v. Aaron, a 1958 school desegregation case in
which the Court for the first time in its history explicitly arrogated to itself the exclusive
power to interpret the Constitution. Unlike the Justices in Cooper, Marshall and his
colleagues did not declare themselves to be the ultimate arbiters of the nation’s constitutional
policy choices, with power to bind coordinate branches of government to their judgments of
constitutionality and thereby invalidate popularly supported legislative policies inconsistent
with the constitutional values they favored.”); Christopher L. Eisgruber, The Fourteenth
Amendment’s Constitution, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 47, 81 (1995) (“If successful, Marshall’s
argument in Marbury establishes only that the Court may pass upon the constitutionality of
laws; the argument does not say anything about whether other branches of the government
must accept the Court’s judgment.”). But see MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION
AWAY FROM THE COURTS 7 (1999) (arguing that Marbury’s sentence can be read either as
simply asserting power of judicial review or as conferring monopoly power).
163. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 177.
164. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958).
165. BREYER, supra note 2, at 21.
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Most of Marshall’s discussion establishes that the judiciary has the
power and duty to review legislation as it becomes pertinent in cases or
controversies to determine whether or not it is constitutional, not that the
Court’s interpretation binds subsequent non-party conduct. That becomes
clearer when the sentences following the one the Court cited are added since
they speak only to the Court’s power of judicial review without claiming a
monopoly or ultimate interpretive power.166 And elsewhere in Marbury,
Marshall suggested that the Court’s power to interpret the Constitution in
the course of its work is not exclusive. He reasoned that courts can interpret
the Constitution since they are governed by it.167 Courts must interpret it to
make certain they remain within its confines.168 He wrote that “it is apparent
that the framers of the Constitution contemplated [the Constitution] as a rule
for the government of courts, as well as of the Legislature.”169 If the fact that
the Constitution bound the courts required them to interpret the Constitution,
it also empowered Congress to interpret the Constitution to make sure it also
stayed within its boundaries.170 Marshall returned to that theme in expanded
form in closing Marbury: “Thus, the particular phraseology of the
Constitution of the United States confirms and strengthens the principle,
supposed to be essential to all written Constitutions, that a law repugnant to
the Constitution is void, and that courts, as well as other departments, are
bound by that instrument.”171
Marshall also rested the judiciary’s power to interpret the
Constitution172 on the Oath Clause173 which compels federal judges to swear
to support the Constitution. How could they fulfill that commitment without
interpreting it? Yet the same logic would also apply to other national and

166. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 177 (“Those who apply the rule to particular cases
must, of necessity, expound and interpret that rule. If two laws conflict with each other, the
Courts must decide on the operation of each.”).
167. Id. at 177–78.
168. Id. at 179.
169. Id. at 179–80.
170. Cf. THOMAS REED POWELL, VAGARIES AND VARIETIES IN CONSTITUTIONAL
INTERPRETATION 7 (1956) (stating that Marshall’s formulation is susceptible to possible but
not inevitable inference that each body must interpret the Constitution for itself).
171. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 180 (emphasis added).
172. Id. (“Why otherwise does it direct the judges to take an oath to support it? . . . Why
does a judge swear to discharge his duties agreeably to the constitution of the United States,
if that constitution forms no rule for his government? if it is closed upon him and cannot be
inspected by him?”).
173. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3 (“The Senators and Representatives before mentioned, and
the Members of the several State Legislatures, and all executive and judicial Officers, both of
the United States and of the several States, shall be bound by Oath or Affirmation, to support
this Constitution; but no religious Test shall ever be required as a Qualification to any Office
or public Trust under the United States.”).
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state officials who also commit to support the Constitution.174 Accordingly,
the Oath Clause tends to rebut the idea that courts have a unique relationship
with the Constitution.
Marbury simply established that the Court had power to interpret the
Constitution in the course of deciding cases and controversies.175 It made no
claim regarding the scope of its power.176 Indeed, a narrow reading of the
case consistent with its facts would limit that power to questions regarding
the Court’s jurisdiction,177 although Marbury hinted, and later decisions
confirmed,178 that the power of judicial review extended further. Marbury
implied that its power to interpret the Constitution was not exclusive.179 And
it made no claim that other branches were bound in later actions by the
Court’s constitutional interpretations.
In fact, such a claim of interpretive superiority would have been
inconsistent with Marshall’s agenda in Marbury. Marshall was trying to
establish foundational principles of American constitutional law including
the power of judicial review, but he was also anxious to avoid a conflict

174. Id.; see 4 MALONE, supra note 149, at 151 (arguing that Marshall’s reliance on oaths
left room for executive and legislative interpretation).
175. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 177–78 (“It is emphatically the province and duty of
the Judicial Department to say what the law is. Those who apply the rule to particular cases
must, of necessity, expound and interpret that rule. If two laws conflict with each other, the
Courts must decide on the operation of each. So, if a law be in opposition to the Constitution,
if both the law and the Constitution apply to a particular case, so that the Court must either
decide that case conformably to the law, disregarding the Constitution, or conformably to the
Constitution, disregarding the law, the Court must determine which of these conflicting rules
governs the case. This is of the very essence of judicial duty.”).
176. See Van Alstyne, supra note 149, at 36–37.
177. See, e.g., POWELL, supra note 170, at 8 (describing this possible interpretation); Van
Alstyne, supra note 149, at 34–36 (describing though rejecting this narrow interpretation of
Marbury).
178. See, e.g., Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 377 (1821) (“If such be the
constitution, it is the duty of the Court to bow with respectful submission to its provisions. If
such be not the constitution, it is equally the duty of this Court to say so; and to perform that
task which the American people have assigned to the judicial department.”); McCulloch v.
Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 400–01 (1819) (“In the case now to be determined, the
defendant, a sovereign state, denies the obligation of a law enacted by the legislature of the
Union, and the plaintiff, on his part, contests the validity of an act which has been passed by
the legislature of that State. . . . On the supreme court of the United States has the
Constitution of our country devolved this important duty.”); id. at 423 (“Should congress, in
the execution of its powers, adopt measures which are prohibited by the constitution, or
should congress, under the pretext of executing its powers, pass laws for the accomplishment
of objects not intrusted to the government, it would become the painful duty of this tribunal,
should a case requiring such a decision come before it, to say that such an act was not the law
of the land.”).
179. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 179–80 (describing the Constitution as binding the
legislature and other departments as well as the courts).
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with Jefferson and Madison. Asserting judicial superiority would have
invited unwanted retaliation.
Moreover, Marshall’s opinion in Marbury deliberately avoided reliance
on executive enforcement which would have tested a claim of judicial
supremacy. The holding, that section 13 was unconstitutional because
Congress could not expand the Court’s original jurisdiction, did not require
the Court to assert that it was the supreme constitutional interpreter. No
other branch needed to comply with the Court’s decision. The Court simply
recognized a limit on its own power by concluding it could not decide
Marbury’s case; it did not require Congress, the President, or anyone else to
acknowledge its interpretive supremacy.
Significantly, Marshall made more modest claims for the judiciary in
Marbury than Alexander Hamilton had made in The Federalist Papers
fifteen years earlier.180 Hamilton had argued that “[t]he interpretation of the
laws is the proper and peculiar province of the courts.”181 Hamilton’s
formulation, particularly in its use of “peculiar,” suggested that the
judiciary’s role in interpreting laws, including the Constitution, was unique.
Hamilton also wrote that the judiciary’s duty was “to declare all acts
contrary to the manifest tenor of the Constitution void.”182 Hamilton further
buttressed that conclusion by calling the judiciary “the least dangerous”
branch since it possessed neither the purse nor the sword.183 Accordingly,
Hamilton reasoned that the judiciary could safely determine the
Constitution’s bounds because it was least able to aggrandize power in a
manner inconsistent with those limits.184 Hamilton accordingly used the
Court’s relative weakness to justify the Court’s role as constitutional
umpire.
By contrast, Marshall did not invoke “the least dangerous branch”
rationale in Marbury. Yes, he wanted to avoid a hopeless confrontation with
Jefferson but without being obsequious. But he also did not need to make
such a sweeping claim regarding judicial supremacy in order to refuse to
exercise original subject matter jurisdiction in Marbury’s case. All he
needed to establish was that the Court had the more limited power of
judicial review.

180.
1961).
181.
182.
183.
184.

THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 464–72 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
Id. at 467.
Id. at 466.
Id. at 465.
Id. at 465–66.
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A Brief Sketch of Judicial Supremacy in History and Doctrine

Notwithstanding the Court’s claim in Cooper, judicial supremacy has
not rested on the sturdy foundation it depicted.185 Not only did Marbury not
support the judicial supremacy proposition the Court asserted in Cooper,
historically Marbury was not read as establishing judicial supremacy in
constitutional interpretation. Before and after Marbury, prominent thinkers
rejected the idea that the judiciary’s constitutional interpretations bound
other non-party actors. In the first years after adoption of the Constitution,
the three branches were widely thought to enjoy interpretive
independence.186 Although courts upheld the constitutionality of the Alien
and Sedition Acts, Thomas Jefferson wrote that the President, deeming
those laws unconstitutional, could use his pardon power to negate those
sentences.187 In his First Inaugural Address, President Abraham Lincoln
conceded that the Supreme Court’s constitutional interpretations bound the
parties to the particular case and merited influence in related matters but
denied that they necessarily bound non-parties.188 Politicians, Richard A.
Fallon, Jr. has pointed out, routinely claim that various judicial decisions
improperly interpret the Constitution and work to change them.189 This
behavior is not unique to this age but characterized earlier times regarding
185. Paul A. Freund, Storm over the American Supreme Court, 21 MOD. L. REV. 345, 346
(1958) (“Resistance to the court has been a persistent strain in American life from the
beginning. . . .”).
186. KRAMER, supra note 149, at 105–10, 135–36.
187. Thomas Jefferson, Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Mrs. John Adams (Sept. 11,
1804), in 11 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 49, 50–51 (Albert Ellery Bergh ed., 1905);
see also 4 MALONE, supra note 149, at 153–56 (discussing Jefferson’s belief that branches of
federal government shared duty to interpret Constitution); id. at 207 (discussing Jefferson’s
pardons and view that the Sedition Act was unconstitutional).
188. Abraham Lincoln, First Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1861), in 4 THE COLLECTED
WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 262, 268 (Roy P. Brasler ed., 1953) (“I do not forget the
position assumed by some, that constitutional questions are to be decided by the Supreme
Court; nor do I deny that such decisions must be binding in any case, upon the parties to a
suit as to the object of that suit, while they are also entitled to very high respect and
consideration, in all parallel cases, by all other departments of the government. And while it
is obviously possible that such decision may be erroneous in any given case, still the evil
effect following it, being limited to that particular case, with the chance that it may be
overruled and never become a precedent for other cases, can better be borne than could the
evils of a different practice. At the same time the candid citizen must confess that if the
policy of the government, upon vital questions, affecting the whole people, is to be
irrevocably fixed by decisions of the Supreme Court, the instant they are made in ordinary
litigation between parties, in personal actions, the people will have ceased, to be their own
rulers, having, to that extent, practically resigned their government, into the hands of that
eminent tribunal.”).
189. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Judicial Supremacy, Departmentalism, and the Rule of Law
in a Populist Age, 96 TEX. L. REV. 487, 498–500 (2018).
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decisions like Dred Scott v. Sandford,190 Plessy v. Ferguson,191 Lochner v.
New York,192 and other judicial mistakes.193
As suggested above, political actors have discharged their duties based
on constitutional interpretations different from those of the courts.
Presidents might veto measures based on constitutional considerations that
take issue with judicial decisions or pardon convicted defendants based on
the view that they were indicted for violating unconstitutional laws as
Jefferson did. Legislators might debate or vote on measures based on
constitutional conclusions that diverge from those the Court has given.
Congress has passed, and Presidents have recognized, legislative veto
provisions194 that seem to run afoul of INS v. Chadha.195
In some areas, courts defer to political institutions in constitutional
interpretation. Although Marbury said that courts could exercise jurisdiction
over executive officials when they allegedly violated individual rights,196 it
recognized that sometimes political actors are given discretion such that
their conduct is not subject to judicial jurisdiction.197 Under the “political
question” doctrine, the Court has recognized a broader set of situations that
are committed to political institutions, namely Congress (or one house or the
other) or the President.198 These matters are nonjusticiable because either the
Constitution delegates decision-making and interpretative authority to a
coordinate political institution or the Court determines there are no judicial
materials to fashion or implement a governing rule or standard.199 Thus, in
Nixon v. United States,200 the Court held that the Senate, not the Court, could
interpret the Constitution’s Impeachment Trial Clause because the
Constitution’s text committed that issue to the Senate, not the judiciary,201
and because of an absence of judicially discoverable and manageable
standards to interpret “try.”202

190. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
191. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
192. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
193. Fallon, supra note 189, at 498–500.
194. Louis Fisher, The Unitary Executive and Inherent Executive Power, 12 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 569, 581 (2010).
195. 462 U.S. 919, 942–43 (1983) (holding legislative veto provision unconstitutional).
196. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 166 (1803).
197. Id.
198. See, e.g., Lain, supra note 26, at 1629–30 (discussing how political question and
other justiciability doctrines leave some constitutional decision-making to political branches).
199. See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (stating that the factors that make the
issue a political question include the textual commitment of the issue to a political
department or the absence of judicial standards).
200. 506 U.S. 224 (1993).
201. Id. at 230–32.
202. Id. at 229–30.
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Sometimes Congress or the President has interpretive authority because
no person has standing to bring an issue to federal court. Thus, the Court
dismissed suits to bar congressmen from serving in the military reserve203
and requiring the Central Intelligence Agency budget to be published204 on
the grounds that the plaintiffs lacked sufficient interest to raise those
challenges. At times, the Court concludes that it cannot formulate
constitutional restraints even though it recognizes that political departments
might do so. Thus, in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit
Authority205 the Court deemed itself unable to fashion a standard to insulate
states from generally applicable regulatory legislation, although it concluded
that Congress might protect the states.206 These examples, among others,
rebut Cooper’s claim that Marbury and American history established
universal judicial supremacy in constitutional interpretation.
The Court’s assertion of judicial supremacy in Cooper has proved
controversial.207 To some extent, the pushback against the claim related to
the exaggerated reading of Marbury and from its inadequacy as a descriptive
account of American constitutional experience. Moreover, even some
sympathetic to the result in Cooper208 questioned the Court’s language
giving its decision the status accorded constitutional provisions under the
Supremacy Clause.209 There is a logical problem with considering the
constitutional interpretation in a Supreme Court decision, even one like
Brown, as the supreme law of the land. If the Court’s decisions have that
status, presumably they bind not only political actors, but judges as well.210
Yet the Court often overrules earlier decisions especially in constitutional
cases, where legislative correction is impossible. As Justice Brandeis put it,
203. Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974).
204. United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974).
205. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
206. Id. at 550–52.
207. See, e.g., Ashutosh Bhagwat, Cooper v. Aaron and the Faces of Federalism, 52 ST.
LOUIS U. L.J. 1087, 1092 (2008); Justin Driver, Supremacies and the Southern Manifesto, 92
TEX. L. REV. 1053, 1102–03 (2014) (stating that Cooper has been widely criticized for
articulating some “dubious” propositions); Farber, supra note 17, at 388 (stating that Cooper
generated “scathing attack from commentators” and giving examples); Strauss, supra note 4,
at 1080 (calling Cooper’s assertion of judicial supremacy “highly controversial”); Wilkinson,
supra note 19, at 520 (stating that the Court went “somewhat overboard”).
208. See, e.g., PHILIP B. KURLAND, POLITICS, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE WARREN COURT
185–86 (1970) (expressing support for Cooper yet stating misgivings regarding the idea of
giving Supreme Court decisions Supremacy Clause status).
209. See, e.g., id. at 185 (questioning the “elevation of Supreme Court decisions to
inclusion in the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution”).
210. See, e.g., id. (referring to the “immutability of constitutional decisions” implicit in
viewing them as part of supreme law); Strauss, supra note 4, at 1080–81 (suggesting a logical
problem with requiring other branches of the national government to comply with judicial
decisions which the Court may overturn).
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“The Court bows to the lessons of experience and the force of better
reasoning, recognizing that the process of trial and error, so fruitful in the
physical sciences, is appropriate also in the judicial function.”211 Brown, of
course, effectively overruled Plessy. If a Supreme Court decision was part of
the supreme law of the land, how was Plessy overruled?212 Moreover,
Professor Philip Kurland thought the Court’s formulation equating the
Court’s decisions with the Constitution made it difficult to even suggest that
the Court overturn a precedent.213
The view that the Court’s rulings are equivalent to the Constitution,
also suggests that constitutional meaning is fixed and certain, not dynamic
and the subject of dispute, as many believe. Judge Wilkinson argued that
Cooper’s language “[t]aken literally” compelled non-party officials “to
immediately support, both in word and in deed, whatever the Court has
said,”214 but that cannot have been the Court’s intent since “taken literally”
that formulation would foreclose criticism of a decision or any action to
change it. A Court that had just effectively overruled a century-old
precedent based on the argument that, whatever its initial merit, it no longer
constituted equal protection,215 could not have intended a meaning that
would forever freeze doctrine in place.216 In fact, it is more plausible to think
that the Court viewed its decisions as entitled to respect under the
Supremacy Clause, not because they were part of the Constitution but
because they were the product of an authorized exercise of constitutional
power,217 a form of constitutional common law that was binding until
properly changed.218
Professor Tribe has suggested a narrower reading of Cooper’s judicial
supremacy claim as applying essentially to Brown and its progeny and
claiming that they had binding effect such that state officials who interfered
with their enforcement “or act to undermine its goals” act “unlawfully.” 219
This view would leave officials free to engage in nonjusticiable behavior
inconsistent with the Court’s interpretation.220

211. Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 407–08 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
212. KURLAND, supra note 208, at 185–86.
213. Id. at 186.
214. Wilkinson, supra note 19, at 520.
215. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 492–95 (1954).
216. See also Recent Attacks upon the Supreme Court: A Statement by Members of the
Bar, supra note 41, at 1128 (statement of prominent lawyers recognizing that critics of a
Supreme Court decision may properly criticize it and seek an “overruling decision”).
217. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 257 (3d ed. 2000).
218. Farber, supra note 17, at 409, 410–11.
219. TRIBE, supra note 217, at 257.
220. Id. at 258.
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Although the Court’s claim in Cooper was inaccurate, it was not
without some basis. Justin Driver argues persuasively that Cooper did not
invent a new doctrine of judicial supremacy but “merely amplified” an
existing notion that courts “enjoyed a privileged role” in constitutional
interpretation.221 Generally speaking, political actors do follow the Court’s
constitutional decisions, even when those decisions impose unpalatable
outcomes.222 In his classic, The American Supreme Court, which first
appeared in 1960, but was apparently completed before Cooper was issued
since it did not mention Little Rock, Robert G. McCloskey wrote that the
power of judicial review
must be nourished and cultivated so that it will grow into the doctrine of
judicial sovereignty, or the idea that a law may be held unconstitutional
if the Court thinks it is, even though the case is not plain, and that the
Court’s opinion to that effect is binding on other branches of
government.223

In part, what McCloskey called judicial sovereignty is widely
recognized because the Court exercises its authority in areas that political
leaders and most citizens “accept as lying within the lawful bounds of
judicial authority.”224 Put differently, the Court generally stays in the lanes
that have been constructed as appropriate for judicial intervention and does
not trespass in those where political discretion seems warranted. The Court
encourages acquiescence through its selective assertion of power and
through the manner in which it acts. Court rationales have presumptive, not
absolute, finality,225 and Presidents and others generally follow the Court’s
constitutional interpretations because of public expectations and because
judicial behavior generally invites acceptance.226

221. Driver, supra note 207, at 1102.
222. See, e.g., Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (deciding, 5-4, that recount of Florida
electoral votes must end, thereby effectively determining that Governor George W. Bush had
won Florida’s electoral votes and the presidency); United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683
(1974) (deciding, 8-0, that President Richard M. Nixon must produce certain White House
tapes that showed that he was complicit in the cover-up of the Watergate break-in from an
early point); Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681 (1997) (declining, 8-0, to stay, during his
presidency, a civil case against President Bill Clinton arising out of alleged pre-presidential
behavior); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952) (deciding, 6-3,
that Secretary of Commerce Charles Sawyer unconstitutionally seized and operated the steel
mills pursuant to President Harry S. Truman’s order).
223. MCCLOSKEY, supra note 59, at 30.
224. Fallon, supra note 189, at 494.
225. Id. at 507.
226. Id. at 507–08.
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IV. JUDICIAL SUPREMACY IN A FEDERALISM CONTEXT
In a sense, though, the Court’s discussion of judicial supremacy in
Cooper, especially its reliance on Marbury as the source of that doctrine,
was beside the point, or beside most of the point. Marbury involved a
situation quite different from that in Cooper. As previously mentioned, in
Marbury the Court interpreted the Constitution to find the case not within its
own original subject matter jurisdiction and accordingly did not need
acquiescence or external support to enforce its judgment or rationale.227 By
contrast, Cooper addressed the refusal of officials to abide by newlypromulgated Supreme Court doctrine regarding the operation of public
schools those officials had a part in running.228 Accordingly, in Little Rock,
unlike in Marbury, the Court very much depended on external acquiescence
and support. Moreover, Marbury involved a separation of powers dispute in
which the Court reviewed, and found unconstitutional, an act of Congress.229
By contrast, Cooper involved a federalism controversy in which state
officials rejected their obligation to follow federal court orders and the
Court’s new interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause as expressed in
Brown.230 Indeed, the latter part of the Court’s judicial supremacy
formulation in Cooper implicitly recognized this distinction since it spoke of
the Supremacy Clause binding the states to follow the Court’s
interpretations of the Fourteenth Amendment (which itself limits the states)
and since it specifically concluded that the Oath Clause binds “[e]very state
legislator and executive and judicial officer” to support the Constitution.231
Ashutosh Bhagwat has perceptively observed that much of the critical
discussion of Cooper’s judicial supremacy statement has addressed the role
of the Court relative to coordinate branches of the federal government and
accordingly is misdirected since the thrust of the Cooper comment was to

227. See supra text accompanying notes 179–80.
228. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
229. See supra text accompanying notes 179–80.
230. Cf. Van Alstyne, supra note 149, at 37 (stating that Marbury does not involve any
question of the role of states in constitutional interpretation); Charles Warren, Earliest Cases
of Judicial Review of State Legislation by Federal Courts, 32 YALE L.J. 15, 15 (1922) (stating
that power of federal judicial review of Congressional and state statutes involves different
considerations). But see MCCLOSKEY, supra note 59, at 44 (arguing that Marbury rationales
for judicial review are broadly stated to apply to state as well as national legislation).
231. 358 U.S. at 18 (“It follows that the interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment
enunciated by this Court in the Brown case is the supreme law of the land, and Art. VI of the
Constitution makes it of binding effect on the States ‘any Thing in the Constitution or Laws
of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.’ Every state legislator and executive and
judicial officer is solemnly committed by oath taken pursuant to Art. VI, cl. 3 ‘to support this
Constitution.’”).
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make a “more modest statement” regarding the obligations of state, not
national, officials.232
The arguments for judicial supremacy in a federalism context differ
from, and are stronger than, in the separation of powers context. There are
textual, historical, structural, and pragmatic reasons why the Court’s
decisions should enjoy a stronger presumption of applicability to non-parties
in a federalism context than regarding a separation of powers issues, and
some doctrine tends to recognize that distinction. Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes, Jr. famously opined, “I do not think the United States would come
to an end if we lost our power to declare an Act of Congress void. I do think
the Union would be imperiled if we could not make that declaration as to the
laws of the several States.”233 Although Holmes spoke of the relative
importance of two species of judicial review, what might be called
horizontal versus vertical judicial review, not judicial supremacy, the
reasons making judicial review more important vertically than horizontally
also inform the discussion regarding judicial supremacy in the federalism
versus separation of powers context.
A federal system needs an umpire to resolve disputes between various
levels of government and the Court has largely inherited that role.234 James
Madison apparently recognized greater deference to the federal judiciary in
deciding federalism controversies than those involving its coordinate
branches.235 Indeed, the text supports that conclusion: in the Supremacy
Clause,236 which makes federal law prevail over state law and binds state
judges to follow federal law in preference to the law from the state of which
they are an officer; the Oath Clause,237 which requires all state officers and
232. Bhagwat, supra note 207, at 1093.
233. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, Law and the Court: Speech at a Dinner of the Harvard
Law School Association of New York, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 291, 295–96 (1920); see
also PAUL A. FREUND, THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: ITS BUSINESS, PURPOSES,
AND PERFORMANCE 99 (1961) (justifying judicial review primarily as “restraint on state
action”).
234. COX, supra note 156, at 21–22 (“The peculiar nature of our federal system also gives
rise to the need for somebody to manage the interplay between State and federal law and
State and federal courts.”).
235. KRAMER, supra note 149, at 186–87.
236. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States
which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made,
under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the
Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any
State to the Contrary notwithstanding.”).
237. Id. cl. 3 (“The Senators and Representatives before mentioned, and the Members of
the several State Legislatures, and all executive and judicial Officers, both of the United
States and of the several States, shall be bound by Oath or Affirmation, to support this
Constitution; but no religious Test shall ever be required as a Qualification to any Office or
public Trust under the United States.”).

2019]

FEDERALISM THROUGH THE LENS OF COOPER

191

legislators to obey the Constitution; the grant of subject matter jurisdiction
to the federal courts of a range of cases in which states are parties; and the
grant of appellate jurisdiction to the Court in cases or controversies within
most of the categories Article III assigns the federal courts.238
Judicial supremacy is implicit in two basic functions of a Supreme
Court in a federalist system—protecting the supremacy and promoting the
uniformity of national law.239 The Supremacy Clause implies federal judicial
power to subject the actions of state officials to constitutional review.240
Indeed, the federal structure of the Constitution implied a constitutional
value that federal constitutional and statutory law should have uniform
meaning. A central function of federal courts, especially the Supreme Court,
is to provide a consistent interpretation for federal law such that its meaning
does not vary in different jurisdictions.241
Although Marbury did not consider whether the Court’s constitutional
decisions bound state officials, other Marshall Court cases addressed that
subject. In Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee,242 Virginia acknowledged the
supremacy of federal law but argued that its highest court had final
interpretive power in cases brought before it.243 The Court, speaking through
Justice Joseph Story, rejected this contention. The Constitution gave the
Supreme Court, not the highest state court, this constitutional power.244
Justice Story further affirmed the Court’s power to declare null and void the
acts of each branch of the state government to preserve the supremacy of
federal law.245 The Court also invoked the importance of uniformity in
238. Ashutosh Bhagwat has suggested that state executive and legislative officials may
have greater leeway to resist the Constitution since the Supremacy Clause speaks directly to
state judges, since Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee established a hierarchy between the Court and
state judiciaries, and to promote judicial efficiency. Bhagwat, supra note 207, at 1099–1100.
Yet if the Supremacy Clause commits state judges to follow constitutional interpretations of
the Court, the Oath Clause would seem to require that state political actors comply with those
same decisions and doctrine. See, e.g., TRIBE, supra note 217, at 255 (noting that the Oath
Clause has been used to compel state nonjudicial officials to comply with the Constitution).
239. Paul A. Freund, A Supreme Court in a Federation: Some Lessons from Legal
History, 53 COLUM. L. REV. 597, 615 (1953) (“The supreme court in federation has two
principal functions: to maintain the supremacy of the constitution and to promote the
uniformity of law.”).
240. POWELL, supra note 170, at 16, 22.
241. Freund, supra note 239, at 598 (“Every federation has thought it necessary to
establish a supreme court which performs the twofold function of interpreting the constitution
and promoting uniformity of law.”).
242. 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816).
243. Id. at 346–47.
244. Id.
245. Id. at 344 (“The courts of the United States can, without question, revise the
proceedings of the executive and legislative authorities of the states, and if they are found to
be contrary to the constitution, may declare them to be of no legal validity. Surely the
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federal law to justify Supreme Court review of state court decisions
regarding matters of federal law.246
In Cohens v. Virginia,247 Chief Justice Marshall rejected Virginia’s
argument that the Constitution allowed each state to interpret the ultimate
meaning of the Constitution and federal law.248 The Constitution made clear,
by its structure and its text, that “[t]he general government, though limited
as to its objects, is supreme with respect to those objects.”249 The federal
judiciary was charged “to decide all cases of every description arising under
the Constitution or laws of the United States” in order to vindicate the
Constitution’s principles.250 He reaffirmed this principle, asking rhetorically:
Is it so improbable that they should confer on the judicial department the
power of construing the Constitution and laws of the Union in every
case, in the last resort, and of preserving them from all violation from
every quarter, so far as judicial decisions can preserve them, that this
improbability should essentially affect the construction of the new
system?251

There Marshall reaffirmed that the federal courts existed to protect the
Constitution and federal law from state intrusions.252 Echoing Story’s
arguments regarding the Court’s role in preserving the supremacy and
uniformity of federal law, Marshall wrote:
exercise of the same right over judicial tribunals is not a higher or more dangerous act of
sovereign power.”).
246. Id. at 347–48 (“That motive is the importance, and even necessity, of uniformity of
decisions throughout the whole United States upon all subjects within the purview of the
constitution. Judges of equal learning and integrity in different States might differently
interpret a statute or a treaty of the United States, or even the constitution itself; if there were
no revising authority to control these jarring and discordant judgments and harmonize them
into uniformity, the laws, the treaties, and the constitution of the United States would be
different in different states, and might perhaps never have precisely the same construction,
obligation, or efficacy in any two states. The public mischiefs that would attend such a state
of things would be truly deplorable, and it cannot be believed that they could have escaped
the enlightened convention which formed the Constitution.”).
247. 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821).
248. Id. at 377 (“[T]he constitution of the United States has provided no tribunal for the
final construction of itself, or of the laws or treaties of the nation; but that this power may be
exercised in the last resort by the Courts of every State in the Union. That the constitution,
laws, and treaties may receive as many constructions as there are States; and that this is not a
mischief, or, if a mischief, is irremediable.”).
249. Id. at 381.
250. Id. at 382.
251. Id. at 388.
252. Id. at 391 (“A more important, a much more interesting, object was the preservation
of the Constitution and laws of the United States, so far as they can be preserved by judicial
authority, and therefore the jurisdiction of the Courts of the Union was expressly extended to
all cases arising under that Constitution and those laws.”).
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Dismissing the unpleasant suggestion that any motives which may not be
fairly avowed, or which ought not to exist, can ever influence a State or
its Courts, the necessity of uniformity, as well as correctness in
expounding the Constitution and laws of the United States, would itself
suggest the propriety of vesting in some single tribunal the power of
deciding, in the last resort, all cases in which they are involved.253

After invoking Marbury, Cooper cited in passing Ableman v. Booth254
for the proposition that the Constitution imposed an oath on state officeholders in order to preserve the Constitution, but elsewhere in the opinion
Ableman came much closer to articulating a doctrine of judicial supremacy
in a federalism context than did Marbury. Having assisted in the escape of a
fugitive slave from federal custody, Ableman was arrested for violating the
federal Fugitive Slave Law but then released on order of the Wisconsin state
courts.255 The federal government appealed to the Supreme Court arguing
that the actions of Wisconsin’s courts was unlawful.256 The Court agreed.257
Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Taney echoed the structural
arguments from Hunter’s Lessee and Cohens regarding the Court’s role in
preserving the supremacy and uniformity of federal law.258 It was necessary
that a federal tribunal be created so cases arising under federal law “should
be finally and conclusively decided.”259 The Supreme Court’s “ultimate
appellate power” was essential to preserve the supremacy and uniformity of
federal law.260 Moreover, since federal and state courts might often differ
regarding constitutional and legal interpretation, the constitutional system
required a Supreme Court to resolve disputes “finally and with out
appeal.”261 States were bound to support the Constitution “[a]nd no power is
253. Cohens, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) at 416.
254. 62 U.S. (21 How.) 506 (1859).
255. Id. at 507–08, 511.
256. Id. at 511–14.
257. Id. at 526.
258. Id. at 517–18 (“But the supremacy thus conferred on this Government could not
peacefully be maintained, unless it was clothed with judicial power equally paramount in
authority to carry it into execution; for if left to the courts of justice of the several States,
conflicting decisions would unavoidably take place, and the local tribunals could hardly be
expected to be always free from the local influences of which we have spoken. And the
Constitution and laws and treaties of the United States, and the powers granted to the Federal
Government, would soon receive different interpretations in different States, and the
Government of the United States would soon become one thing in one State and another
thing in another.”); id. at 518 (stating that Supreme Court was needed “to secure the
independence and supremacy” of the federal government and to make the Constitution and
federal law uniform).
259. Id.
260. Ableman, 62 U.S. (21 How.) at 518.
261. Id. at 519–20 (“And as the courts of a State, and the courts of the United States,
might, and indeed certainly would, often differ as to the extent of the powers conferred by the
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more clearly conferred by the Constitution and laws of the United States
than the power of this court to decide, ultimately and finally, all cases
arising under such Constitution and laws[.]”262
To be sure, Martin, Cohens, and Ableman spoke of the Court’s role
resolving cases on final appeal rather than making the sort of sweeping
statement the Court made in Cooper. Yet the underlying values of
supremacy and uniformity of federal law could only be served if the
meanings the Court inferred from the Constitution were generally binding. If
the Court’s analysis applied only in the case decided, inconsistent behavior
in other jurisdictions could frustrate the purposes behind Supreme Court
appellate review by subordinating federal law or construing and applying it
differently than the Court did.
The adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868 signaled further
subordination of state government to constitutional norms within the broad
area it covered. In a single sentence, the Amendment protected as against
adverse state action privileges or immunities of United States citizens and
prohibited states from denying persons the equal protection of the laws or
life, liberty, or property without due process of law.263 The language
suggested the constitutionalization of a range of rights, thereby limiting state
autonomy.264 In The Slaughter-House Cases,265 Justice Miller, writing for
the majority, recognized that an expansive reading of the Fourteenth
Amendment would make the Supreme Court “a perpetual censor upon all
legislation of the States, on the civil rights of their own citizens, with
authority to nullify such as it did not approve as consistent with those rights,
as they existed at the time of the adoption of this amendment.”266 Justice
Miller rejected the proposition that the Amendment protected white butchers
from the state-created monopoly there in question, but he did not deny that it
gave the Court such broad power over state authorities regarding claims of
African-Americans alleging racial discrimination, the class he identified as
its intended beneficiaries.267 The imposition of new constitutional norms on

General Government, it was manifest that serious controversies would arise between the
authorities of the United States and of the States, which must be settled by force of arms,
unless some tribunal was created to decide between them finally and with out appeal.”); see
also id. at 520 (describing the Supreme Court as exercising “final appellate power” so
disputes could be “finally settled”).
262. Id. at 525.
263. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
264. Joel K. Goldstein, Teaching the Transformative Fourteenth Amendment, 62 ST.
LOUIS U. L.J. 581 (2018).
265. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872).
266. Id. at 78.
267. Id. at 67–68, 71–72, 81.
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the states through the Fourteenth Amendment268 expanded the Court’s role
as constitutional reviewer in a federalism context and the uniformity and
supremacy imperatives suggested that the doctrine produced should apply to
non-parties.269
The idea that state officials needed to defer to federal judges regarding
the meaning of the Constitution or federal statutes was hardly a heretical
idea. Indeed, in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins,270 the Court’s most
significant recognition of state judicial power in the twentieth century, the
Court, implicitly and explicitly, recognized areas in which the Supreme
Court enjoyed interpretive supremacy. Since Erie held that state legislatures
and highest courts were supreme regarding state law and were entitled to
deference from federal courts in those spheres,271 the mirror image would
also seem to follow, that the Supreme Court’s constitutional interpretations
were authoritative vis-à-vis state officials.272 Justice Louis Brandeis did not
leave that point wholly to inference, although his formulation might have
been more broadly stated.273
Finally, the practical exigencies of governing a federal system would
seem to require greater deference to Court decisions in a vertical than
horizontal context. In criticizing the sweep of the Court’s judicial supremacy
pronouncement, Kurland had argued that Brown did not bind non-parties
like Arkansas but provided a precedent that courts needed to follow in other
litigation, including that involving the Little Rock schools, and that when
followed, the lower federal or state court decisions became part of the
supreme law of the land.274 In such litigation, Arkansas officials could
appeal to the Court and ask it to revisit or overrule Brown, but absent such
judicial action the state officials were bound to follow the lower court
order.275 Yet such an approach creates the possibility of an endless series of
challenges to judicial decisions as various local jurisdictions refuse to

268. See, e.g., JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL
REVIEW 22–30 (1980).
269. But see Eisgruber, supra note 162, at 81–84 (arguing that Fourteenth Amendment
undercuts argument for judicial supremacy).
270. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
271. Id. at 78 (“Except in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or by Acts of
Congress, the law to be applied in any case is the law of the State. And whether the law of the
State shall be declared by its Legislature in a statute or by its highest court in a decision is not
a matter of federal concern.”).
272. See Farber, supra note 17, at 390.
273. Erie, 304 U.S. at 79 (“Supervision over either the legislative or the judicial action of
the States is in no case permissible except as to matters by the constitution specifically
authorized or delegated to the United States.”).
274. KURLAND, supra note 208, at 117–18.
275. Id.
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comply with a Court constitutional interpretation until it is applied to them
through litigation and judgment.
Although the Court had not previously issued a Cooper-like statement
of judicial supremacy in a federalism context, the theory enjoyed significant
jurisprudential support. In 1938, then Professor Felix Frankfurter had termed
“the special function of the Supreme Court . . . to mediate between the
individual and government, and to mark the boundaries between state and
national action.”276 Frankfurter continued that “[t]he Court is the final
authority in adjusting the relationships of the individual to the separate
states, of the individual to the United States, of the forty-eight states to one
another, and of the states to the Union.”277
Almost two years before the Court decided Cooper, leading American
lawyers issued a statement that sounded many of the themes that case later
articulated. The December 1956 pronouncement, which leading lawyers and
law scholars signed, declared that “[i]n cases of disagreement” the federal
judiciary existed “to interpret the Constitution for us” with the Supreme
Court being “the embodiment of judicial power.”278 Individuals might
disagree with a Supreme Court decision or seek to have it reversed by a
subsequent Supreme Court decision or constitutional amendment, but they
had “a duty to recognize the decision as the supreme law of the land as long
as it remains in force.”279 The Court may not have asserted its supremacy in
constitutional interpretation before Cooper, but there was support for some
version of such a position in a federalism context, and the proposition found
some support among leading lawyers.
V. EISENHOWER AND JUDICIAL SUPREMACY
President Eisenhower was among those who embraced the idea that
Supreme Court decisions bound other officials. Although President
Eisenhower has been criticized for failing to provide more enthusiastic
support for Brown,280 the actions of Eisenhower and his administration were
important in the Court’s articulation of judicial supremacy in Cooper.
Eisenhower did not champion Brown,281 but he did embrace the idea that the
276. FELIX FRANKFURTER, MR. JUSTICE HOLMES AND THE SUPREME COURT 5 (1938).
277. Id.
278. Recent Attacks upon the Supreme Court: A Statement by Members of the Bar, supra
note 41, at 1128.
279. Id.
280. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
281. See, e.g., The President’s News Conference of August 11, 1954, 1954 PUB. PAPERS
696, 700 (Aug. 11, 1954) (stating that “the subject has not even been mentioned to me” in
response to question whether he had considered asking Congress to legislate to enforce
school integration).
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Supreme Court was the supreme constitutional expositor and that he was
bound to enforce federal court orders.282 He articulated those ideas
frequently after the Court decided Brown especially after he was re-elected
in 1956 and in 1957 and 1958 with reference to Little Rock.
When Eisenhower was questioned in his regular press conference
whether he had any advice for the South two days after the Court’s decision
in Brown, he said, in pertinent part, “The Supreme Court has spoken and I
am sworn to uphold the constitutional processes in this country; and I will
obey.”283 The following year, Eisenhower told the American Bar
Association that one product of Chief Justice John Marshall’s work had
been “to create among Americans a deep feeling of trust and respect for the
Judiciary.”284 When asked about efforts to include an anti-discrimination
requirement in the School Construction Bill, Eisenhower again stated his
commitment to the Court’s decisions which he characterized as
“complete”285 even while suggesting that the rider should be left out,286
especially since the Court had said desegregation should be implemented
gradually.287
When asked in February 1956 about his reaction to the interposition
resolutions four states had passed denying that the Supreme Court was the
ultimate constitutional interpreter, Eisenhower obfuscated, but his answer
implicitly accepted the binding nature of the Court’s decision even as he

282. See, e.g., Driver, supra note 207, at 1116–18 (providing brief discussion of
Eisenhower’s support for judicial supremacy).
283. The President’s News Conference of May 19, 1954, 1954 PUB. PAPERS 489, 491
(May 19, 1954); see also The President’s News Conference of November 23, 1954, 1954
PUB. PAPERS 1060, 1066 (Nov. 23, 1954) (“[T]he Supreme Court has ruled what the law is in
this case, what the Constitution means.”).
284. Address at the Annual Convention of the American Bar Association, Philadelphia,
1955 PUB. PAPERS 802, 803 (Aug. 24, 1955).
285. The President’s News Conference of January 25, 1956, 1956 PUB. PAPERS 182, 186
(Jan. 25, 1956) (“Now, when it comes to my devotion to the Constitution—what it
provides—my devotion to the decisions of the Supreme Court, particularly when they are
unanimous, I hope is complete.”).
286. Id. (“Now, it isn’t though quite as simple as that. If we go to the other end and begin
to talk about laws, I believe that every law, every important bill, and every important purpose
from Congress should be in a bill of its own, so that we don’t get a confusion of issues and,
therefore, don’t know for what we are voting or what we are not voting for.”).
287. Id. (“The Supreme Court, in reaching its decision as to what the law was, provided,
and specifically provided, there be a gradual implementation, and referred it back to the
district courts so that it should be gradual.”); id. (“But I just think that is the way I would
handle it, to put it very clearly, because we want the schools now; and as much as the
decision of the Supreme Court must be implemented, they said themselves, implemented
gradually, because they recognize the deep ruts of prejudice and emotionalism that have been
built up over the years in this problem.”).

198

UA LITTLE ROCK LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41

emphasized that the Court called for gradual implementation.288 When
Eisenhower was asked the following month about the Southern Manifesto,
his answer implicitly accepted the Supreme Court’s interpretations of the
Constitution as binding.289 And when asked about the possibility that some
288. The President’s News Conference of February 29, 1956, 1956 PUB. PAPERS 263,
269–70 (Feb. 29, 1956) (“William V. Shannon, New York Post: As you may know, four of
the southern State legislatures have passed interposition resolutions stating that the
Supreme Court decision outlawing segregation has no force and effect in their States; and I
was wondering what you thought about this concept of interposition, and what you thought
was the role of the Federal Government in enforcing the Supreme Court decision? THE
PRESIDENT. Well, of course, you have asked a very vast question that is filled with
argument on both sides. You have raised the question of States rights versus Federal power;
you have particularly brought up the question whether the Supreme Court is the last word we
have in the interpretation of our Constitution. Now, this is what I say: there are adequate legal
means of determining all of these factors. The Supreme Court has issued its own operational
directives and delegated power to the district courts. I expect that we are going to make
progress, and the Supreme Court itself said it does not expect revolutionary action suddenly
executed. We will make progress, and I am not going to attempt to tell them how it is going
to be done.”).
289. The President’s News Conference of March 14, 1956, 1956 PUB. PAPERS 301, 303–
05 (Mar. 14, 1956) (“Edward P. Morgan, American Broadcasting Company: Mr. President,
southern members of Congress, including a couple of Republicans, have posed a direct
challenge to both the other branches of Government, first, in the implied if not declared threat
to block your appointments to the judiciary, which might find disfavor on the racial issue;
and, second, in a manifesto which was introduced in Congress on Monday, in which some
100 members of the House and Senate commit themselves to try to overturn the
Supreme Court decision on segregation. Would you comment on those developments, sir,
particularly with reference to what you think the Executive responsibility is and should be.
THE PRESIDENT. Well, you are asking a question that we are probably going to be busy on
for a while. First, I have nothing whatsoever to say about their right to confirm or not
confirm. The constitutional duty of the Senate to act as it sees fit upon the nominations sent
up by the President is clear. I could urge publicly, and I probably would if I thought there
were unnecessary blocks, but that is their business, and that doesn’t call, as I see it, for any
further comment. Now, the first thing about the manifesto is this: that they say they are going
to use every legal means. No one in any responsible position anywhere has talked
nullification; there would be a place where we get to a very bad spot for the simple reason I
am sworn to defend and uphold the Constitution of the United States and, of course, I can
never abandon or refuse to carry out my own duty. Let us remember that the
Supreme Court itself talked about emotionalism in this question, and it was for that reason
that it said, ‘Progress must be gradual.’ Now, let us not forget there has been some progress. I
believe there is something on the order of more than a quarter of a million of Negro children
in the border and some southern States, that have been integrated in the schools, and except
for a certain area in which the difficulties are greatest, there has been progress. As a matter of
fact, there was not long ago a decision by the Supreme Court of Texas to the general effect
that anything in the laws or in the Constitution of the State of Texas that was in defiance of
the Constitution of the United States was null and void. So, let us remember that there are
people who are ready to approach this thing with moderation, but with the determination to
make the progress that the Supreme Court asked for. If ever there was a time when we must
be patient without being complacent, when we must be understanding of other people’s deep
emotions as well as our own, this is it. Extremists on neither side are going to help this
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of his supporters might defy the Supreme Court’s decision in Brown, he
replied in part that “when we carry this to the ultimate, remember that the
Constitution, as interpreted by the Supreme Court, is our basic law,”290
essentially the claim the Court later made in Cooper. On October 11, 1956,
Eisenhower reaffirmed his obligation to enforce the Constitution as
interpreted by the Supreme Court.291 Although some of Eisenhower’s
answers could have been clearer,292 Eisenhower essentially adhered to the

situation, and we can only believe that the good sense, the common sense, of Americans will
bring this thing along. The length of time I am not even going to talk about; I don’t know
anything about the length of time it will take. We are not talking here about coercing, using
force in a general way; we are simply going to uphold the Constitution of the United States,
see that the progress as ordered by them is carried out. Now, let us remember this one thing,
and it is very important: the people who have this deep emotional reaction on the other side
were not acting over these past three generations in defiance of law. They were acting in
compliance with the law as interpreted by the Supreme Court of the United States under the
decision of 1896. Now, that has been completely reversed, and it is going to take time for
them to adjust their thinking and their progress to that. But I have never yet given up my
belief that the American people, faced with a great problem like this, will approach it
intelligently and with patience and with understanding, and we will get somewhere; and I do
deplore any great extreme action on either side.”).
290. The President’s News Conference of March 21, 1956, 1956 PUB. PAPERS 327, 340
(Mar. 21, 1956).
291. The President’s News Conference of October 11, 1956, 1956 PUB. PAPERS 880, 884
(Oct. 11, 1956) (“Charles W. Roberts, Newsweek: On September 5 you stated that it was not
important whether you endorsed the Supreme Court’s decision on integration so long as it
was enforced. Since then a number of people, mostly Democrats, have said that it is
important whether you endorse the decision. Could you amplify your position on that? THE
PRESIDENT. Look, I put that in this way: We start out with article I of the Constitution, and
we go on right down to the end, including its amendments, and the Constitution as it is
interpreted by the Supreme Court, I am sworn to uphold it. I don’t ask myself whether every
single phase of that Constitution, with all its amendments, are exactly what I agree with or
not. I am sworn to uphold it, and that is what I intend to do.”).
292. The President’s News Conference of September 3, 1957, 1957 PUB. PAPERS 639,
640–41 (Sept. 3, 1957) (“Merriman Smith, United Press: Mr. President, over quite a wide
section of the South today and this week, children are going back to school under difficult
circumstances, in places where integration is being attempted for the first time. We have a
case in Arkansas this morning where the Governor has ordered State troops around a school
that a Federal court had ordered integrated. I just wonder what you think of this situation.
THE PRESIDENT. Well, first, to say ‘what you think about it’ is sort of a broad subject that
you are giving me. Actually, this particular incident came to my attention the first thing this
morning. I have been in contact with the Attorney General’s office. They are taking a look at
it. They are going to find out exactly what has happened, and discuss this with the Federal
judge. As of this moment, I cannot say anything further about the particular point, because
that is all I know about it. Now, time and again a number of people—I, among them—have
argued that you cannot change people’s hearts merely by laws. Laws presumably express the
conscience of a nation and its determination or will to do something. But the laws here are to
be executed gradually, according to the dictum of the Supreme Court, and I understand that
the plan worked out by the school board of Little Rock was approved by the district judge. I
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idea that he would enforce the Constitution as interpreted by the Supreme
Court.
As the situation in Little Rock gained prominence, Eisenhower said as
much in a telegram to Faubus in September 1957.293 “When I became
President, I took an oath to support and defend the Constitution of the
United States,” Eisenhower wrote.294 “The only assurance I can give you is
that the Federal Constitution will be upheld by me by every legal means at
my command.”295 Eisenhower denied that federal authorities were
considering arresting Faubus or had tapped his phone lines and expressed
confidence that he and other Arkansas authorities including the National
Guard would cooperate with the federal court.296 He also consistently argued
that as President he was obligated to support decisions of federal courts. 297
believe it is a ten-year plan. Now there seems to have been a road block thrown in the way of
that plan, and the next decision will have to be by the lawyers and jurists.”).
293. Telegram on Assurance to the Governor, supra note 83, at 659; see also President’s
Statement After Meeting with Governor, supra note 89, at 674.
294. Telegram on Assurance to the Governor, supra note 83, at 659.
295. Id.
296. Id.
297. The President’s News Conference of May 14, 1958, 1958 PUB. PAPERS 394, 397
(May 14, 1958) (“That is right, to obey a court order; and that is the point. I did not send
troops anywhere because of an argument or a statement by a governor about segregation.
There was a court order, and there was not only mob interference with the execution of that
order, but there was a statement by the Governor that he would not intervene to see that
that court order would be exercised. That is exactly what I did. Now, I don’t know, I am not
going to try to predict what the exact circumstances in any other case will be. But I do say
this: I deplore the need or the use of troops anywhere to get American citizens to obey the
orders of constituted courts; because I want to point this one thing out: there is no person in
this room whose basic rights are not involved in any successful defiance to the carrying out
of court orders. For example, let us assume one of you were arrested, and you were arrested
by a sheriff who didn’t think what you were doing in the particular town was correct, and the
town was inflamed against you; but the Federal judge says—this taking place, let’s say, on
some Federal property—the Federal judge comes in and says he will issue a writ of habeas
corpus. You are in jail, unjustly, illegally, unconstitutionally; but there is no power there—the
governor won’t intervene; the marshal of the court is powerless; no one can do anything.
Now, what is a President going to do? That is a question you people answer for yourselves. I
answered it for myself.”); Statement by the President Concerning the Removal of the Soldiers
Stationed at Little Rock, 1958 PUB. PAPERS 387, 387 (May 8, 1958) (“I trust that state and
local officials and citizens will assume their full responsibility and duty for seeing that the
orders of the federal Court are not obstructed. The faithful execution of this responsibility
will make it unnecessary for the federal Government to act further to preserve the integrity of
our judicial processes.”); The President’s News Conference of October 3, 1957, 1957 PUB.
PAPERS 704, 705–06 (Oct. 3, 1957) [hereinafter President’s October 3 News Conference]
(“The National Guard, or the State Guard at that moment, was called out and given orders to
do certain things which were a definite direct defiance of a Federal court’s order. That put the
issue squarely up to the Executive part of the Government, and I would not, as I told you
once before in this meeting—such as this—I couldn’t conceive that anyone would so forget
common sense and our common obligations of loyalty to the Constitution of America that
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Indeed, he presented his action as necessary to vindicate the rule of law.298
Eisenhower suggested that public officials sometimes must follow Supreme
force of this kind would ever have to be used for any purpose. But I just say this: the courts
must be sustained or it’s not America.”); Statement by the President Regarding Continued
Federal Surveillance at Little Rock, 1957 PUB. PAPERS 701, 701 (Oct. 1, 1957) (stating that
since Faubus’s statement failed to commit to sufficiently prevent obstruction of federal court
orders, he had “no recourse at the present time except to maintain Federal surveillance of the
situation.”); Telegram to Senator Russell of Georgia Regarding the Use of Federal Troops at
Little Rock, 1957 PUB. PAPERS 695, 696 (Sept. 28, 1957) (“When a State, by seeking to
frustrate the orders of a Federal Court, encourages mobs of extremists to flout the orders of a
Federal Court, and when a State refuses to utilize its police powers to protect against mobs
persons who are peaceably exercising their right under the Constitution as defined in
such Court orders, the oath of office of the President requires that he take action to give that
protection. Failure to act in such a case would be tantamount to acquiescence in anarchy and
the dissolution of the union.”).
298. Statement by the President on Compliance with Final Orders of the Courts, 1958
PUB. PAPERS 631 (Aug. 20, 1958) (“This case, however, or any person’s agreement or
disagreement with its outcome, must not be confused with the solemn duty that all Americans
have to comply with the final orders of the court. . . . Defiance of this duty would present the
most serious problem, but there can be no equivocation as to the responsibility of the federal
government in such an event. My feelings are exactly as they were a year ago. As I said then:
‘The very basis of our individual rights and freedoms rests upon the certainty that the
President and the Executive Branch of Government will support and insure the carrying out
of the decisions of the Federal Courts.’ Every American must understand that if an
individual, community or state is going successfully and continuously to defy the courts, then
there is anarchy.”); The President’s News Conference of March 26, 1958, 1958 PUB. PAPERS
232 (Mar. 26, 1958) (“Now I have preached, since the day I came to this office, and long
before, that we are going to solve some of these great internal social problems of the United
States of America by reason, by education, by tolerance of the other fellow’s views. I do not
believe that all of these problems can be solved just by a new law, or something that someone
says, with teeth in it. For example, when we got into the Little Rock thing, it was not my
province to talk about segregation or desegregation. I had the job of supporting a
federal court that had issued a proper order under the Constitution, and where compliance
was prevented by action that was unlawful. I had to do that, and that is an entirely different
thing from me starting out new laws for attacking this basic problem, which I again say is not
going to be solved finally until it is done by understanding and reason.”); President’s October
3 News Conference, supra note 297, at 704 (“I think, having answered your specific
question, it is well to remember, to re-emphasize to ourselves why the troops are there. The
problem grew out of the segregation problem, but the troops are not there as a part of the
segregation problem. They are there to uphold the courts of the land under a law that was
passed in 1792 because it was early discovered that unless we supported the courts in whose
hands are all our freedoms and our liberties, our protection against autocratic government,
then the kind of government set up by our forefathers simply would not work. That is why
they are there, and for no other purpose, and it is merely incidental that the problem grew out
of the segregation problem.”); id. at 710 (“But I want to point to this: the great overwhelming
mass of America believes that our courts and the respect for our courts must be sustained.
The people that are defying the Courts are doing so under a very mistaken notion of what can
happen, because if we can with impunity defy successfully the orders of the court in one
regard, we can in all regards. Consequently, if a case comes up where your right to print the
news as you see it is challenged by the Government, and the courts find that you are innocent,
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Court decisions they opposed as had Southern governors with whom he had
met.299 Although Eisenhower thought that equal rights depended on changes
in personal feeling and morality which law could not impose,300 he also
committed to implement Supreme Court decisions. Indeed, Eisenhower
refused to discuss his own views on school desegregation because he was
constitutionally obligated to follow the Constitution as interpreted by the
Supreme Court.301
Officials in the Eisenhower Justice Department made clear their belief
that the Court’s decision in Brown was entitled to respect. As the Supreme
Court prepared to hear oral arguments in Cooper, Attorney General William
and the Government says, ‘We will do nothing that the court says,’ what is going to be the
result except chaos and anarchy? These courts are not here merely to enforce integration.
These courts are our bulwarks, our shield against autocratic government. Now, I think,
therefore, you can say with certainty to these people the mass of America believes in the
sanctity of the court. There is a very great division on the destiny of the races in the United
States, how they should act, particularly when we come into the social aspects of our lives as
opposed merely to the economic and the legal. But those quarrels will, as some others in the
past in our country, eventually be settled. But we will, the population itself on the whole, will
remember its respect for law; and it will be settled on that basis.”).
299. President’s October 3 News Conference, supra note 297, at 704 (“Now, the people
that visited me, the governors, understand this responsibility that is on the Executive, on the
President, in this connection. They are aware of it themselves. They themselves opposed and
differed with the decision of the Supreme Court. They don’t like it. They are doing their duty
as good citizens and responsible officials. They were helpful, cooperative and I must say
excited my admiration as citizens who wanted to do their duty even when disagreeable.”); id
at 709 (“And as I say, it is this kind of spirit that has been exhibited by these four governors
who visited me themselves, . . . I know most of them absolutely opposed to the content of the
decision and the orders of the courts, nevertheless, as loyal citizens, carrying them out.”).
300. See, e.g., The President’s News Conference of July 2, 1958, 1958 PUB. PAPERS 511,
514 (July 2, 1958) (“Now, my own idea is this: the Attorney General will execute, so far as
the Constitution of our land implies for him, all the duties laid upon him. At the same time, I
still hold, as I have always held, that the true cure for our racial difficulties lies with each
citizen in this land—each citizen examining himself, seeing whether he is doing his duty as is
expected by our basic Constitution and legal procedures, and whether he is trying at least to
obey law and logic and correct procedures rather than his own prejudices and emotions. This,
to my mind, is something that must come about before law, that might be called punitive law,
can ever be universally successful. Of course, it will have its effect, and it will be executed as
laid down by the Supreme Court procedures. But the fact is that we must look to ourselves in
more of this business.”).
301. The President’s News Conference of August 20, 1958, 1958 PUB. PAPERS 621, 626
(Aug. 20, 1958) (“I have always declined to do that for the simple reason that here was
something that the Supreme Court says, ‘This is the direction of the Constitution, this is the
instruction of the Constitution’; that is, they say, ‘This is the meaning of the Constitution.’
Now, I am sworn to one thing, to defend the Constitution of the United States, and execute its
laws. Therefore, for me to weaken public opinion by discussion of separate cases, where I
might agree or might disagree, seems to me to be completely unwise and not a good thing to
do. I have an oath; I expect to carry it out. And the mere fact that I could disagree very
violently with a decision, and would so express myself, then my own duty would be much
more difficult to carry out I think. So I think it is just not good business for me to do so.”).
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P. Rogers addressed the American Bar Association annual meeting in
California.302 In addition to explaining Brown sympathetically,303 Rogers
made clear that it represented the law of the land and was obligatory on
officials. “In our system of government, of course, the Constitution is the
supreme law of the land and it is the function of the judiciary to expound
it,”304 he said, echoing, but not citing Marbury, but invoking Alexander
Hamilton’s Federalist 78. This principle, Rogers said, was “the very
cornerstone of our federal system.”305 Although Rogers recognized that
Brown II had left some issues open for resolution, he voiced no patience for
those whose “intent” was “defiance.”306 “[T]ime to work out constructive
measures in an honest effort to comply is one thing; time used as a cloak to
achieve complete defiance of the law of the land is quite another[,]”307 he
said, explicitly recognizing the Court’s decision in Brown as supreme law.
Although Rogers pointed out that the United States was not a party in Brown
and that implementation involved the local courts and the parties, he made
clear that the federal government could become engaged, as it had in other
instances, in various ways.308 That would be particularly true if a state
impeded a judicial decree through misuse of state military forces or failed to
protect those whose rights a court had determined and violence hindered the
exercise of those rights.309 These, of course, were the precise conditions that
had occurred in Little Rock. If a state failed to meet its responsibility by
impeding a decree or by failing to protect individuals’ rights from
lawlessness, “there can be no equivocation.”310 As Eisenhower had said, the
federal government would act to “‘support and insure’” the execution of
federal court orders.311 In concluding, Rogers reiterated that “[t]he decision
of the Supreme Court in the school cases and in related fields is the law of
the land[,]” thereby embracing again the judicial supremacy idea, repeated
Eisenhower’s view that defiance would lead to anarchy, stated that states
were obligated to protect the “lawfully determined rights” of individuals
from violence, and committed the federal government to step in to enforce
court orders if the states failed.312

302. William P. Rogers, The Problem of School Segregation: A Serious Challenge to
American Citizens, 45 A.B.A. J. 23, 23 (1958).
303. Id. at 23–24.
304. Id. at 24.
305. Id.
306. Id.
307. Id.
308. Rogers, supra note 302, at 24–25.
309. Id. at 25.
310. Id. at 26.
311. Id.
312. Id.

204

UA LITTLE ROCK LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41

Although no party expressly supported interposition before the Court,
the description of events and the parties’ arguments placed that issue
squarely before the Court. At oral argument on September 11, 1958,
Solicitor General J. Lee Rankin argued that state officials needed “to carry
out the obligation of the Constitution of the United States as interpreted by
this Court,”313 implicitly anticipating the judicial supremacy articulation. He
further asserted that the Little Rock schools should educate “the people that
this Supreme Court has spoken, that’s the law of the land; it’s binding;
we’ve got to do it” and that their duty as citizens was “to obey the law and
to support the Constitution.”314
When the Court issued its decision on September 12, 1958, Eisenhower
emphasized that it was unanimous and appealed “to the sense of civic
responsibility that animates the vast majority of our citizenry to avoid
defiance of the Court’s orders in this matter.”315 He invoked common
knowledge that “if an individual, a community or a state is going
continuously and successfully to defy the rulings of the Courts, then anarchy
results.”316 States and localities had a “constitutional duty to maintain peace
and order.”317 If they faithfully discharged this responsibility, “then lawless
elements will not be able by force and violence to deprive school children of
their Constitutional rights.”318 In closing, Eisenhower invoked the rule of
law: “I hope that all of us may live up to our traditional and proud boast that
ours is a government of laws. Let us keep it that way.”319
When Virginia and Arkansas closed public schools later that month
rather than comply with court orders consistent with Brown, Eisenhower
said, “[D]irect consequences to the children in those schools and the
eventual consequences to our Nation could be disastrous” and took the
occasion implicitly to endorse Brown.320
313. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 127, at 60, reprinted in LANDMARK BRIEFS,
supra note 120, at 725.
314. Id. at 61, reprinted in LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 120, at 726.
315. Statement by the President Concerning the Supreme Court Order in the Little Rock
School Case, 1958 PUB. PAPERS 701, 701 (Sept. 12, 1958).
316. Id.
317. Id.
318. Id.
319. Id.
320. Letter to the Chairman, Committee for Public Education, Charlottesville, Virginia,
1958 PUB. PAPERS 705, 705–06 (Sept. 25, 1958) (“Most of us in the United States, as part of
our religious faith, believe that all men are equal in the sight of God. Indeed, our forefathers
enshrined this belief in the Declaration of Independence as a self-evident truth. Just as we
strive to live up to our fundamental convictions, we constantly strive to achieve this ideal of
the equality of man. We had been making progress—substantial progress—toward that goal.
The closing of the schools, however, represents a material setback not only in that progress,
but in what we have come to regard as a fundamental human right—the right to a public
education.”).
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In mid-September, five days after the Court decided Cooper v. Aaron
but twelve days before it issued its opinion, Rogers spoke in Washington,
D.C. to a National Conference on Citizenship.321 Rogers observed that
opponents of Brown argue that a Supreme Court decision was not “an
authoritative expression of the law,” a position Rogers disparaged as “an
unsound idea which causes misunderstanding and confusion.”322 The
Constitution was the supreme law, but it required interpretation which
occurred “in concrete cases,”323 Rogers said. The Constitution’s framers
intended that “the ultimate responsibility for interpreting the Constitution
and for determining whether governmental action squares with
constitutional requirements should be vested in the federal judiciary.”324
Once again he relied on Hamilton for the proposition that the Court was to
“ascertain” constitutional meaning,325 to serve as “the final arbiter in
constitutional controversies.”326 This idea, “that the judiciary finally must
determine challenges to the constitutionality of acts of the federal and state
governments” was “central to our political structure.”327 Individuals who
disagreed with the Court’s decisions could seek to try to amend the
Constitution but could not pick and choose which judicial decrees to obey.328
The Constitution imposed on federal and state officers the obligation to take
an oath to support the Constitution but that was not an oath to interpret it as
the individual thought appropriate “but as it is interpreted by our courts.”329
After the Court handed down its opinion in Cooper, Eisenhower issued
another statement endorsing Brown and Cooper. Although much of
Eisenhower’s statement endorsed “equal justice under law” as a central
American ideal, Eisenhower began by declaring it “incumbent upon all
Americans, public officials and private citizens alike, to recognize their duty
of complying with the rulings of the highest court in the land. Any other
course, as I have said before, would be fraught with grave consequences to
our nation.”330

321. William P. Rogers, Desegregation in the Schools: The Citizen’s Responsibility, 45
CORN. L. REV. 488, 494 n.* (1958).
322. Id. at 495.
323. Id. at 495–96.
324. Id. at 496.
325. Id. at 497 (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 485 (Alexander Hamilton) (Henry
Cabot Lodge ed., 1888)).
326. Id. at 497.
327. Rogers, supra note 321, at 497.
328. Id. at 498.
329. Id.
330. Statement by the President on the Duty of Compliance with
Supreme Court Decisions, 1958 PUB. PAPERS 722, 722 (Oct. 1, 1958) [hereinafter President’s
Statement on Compliance with Court].
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In October 1958, shortly after the Cooper opinion came out, Rogers
returned to California to again address the subject. Resistance to Brown was
damaging America’s standing around the world, he told the California State
Bar.331 He summarized Cooper positively, highlighting the “fundamental . . .
proposition that it is the province and the duty of the federal judiciary to
interpret and expound the law of the Constitution,” a principle that “from the
earliest days of the Republic . . . has been recognized [as] a permanent and
indispensable feature of our constitutional system of government.”332
Contrary to what some state officials had suggested, Cooper made it clear
that states could not preserve segregation in public schools, Rogers said.333
People could try to change the law through constitutional amendment, but
disagreement with the Supreme Court’s decisions did not license its critics
“to override the Court’s mandate,” he said.334
Finally, in December 1958, Rogers told the Anti-Defamation League
that “[t]he legal issue has been settled” such that “defiance” by “extremists
and fanatics” could not be countenanced and that the Justice Department
would act vigorously against “guilty parties.”335 The “misconception” that
Brown “was something less than an authoritative expression of the law” had
been “effectively dispelled.”336 The decision could not be “nullified.”337
Yet Eisenhower’s support and the Court’s opinion in Cooper were not
enough to make Brown a reality in Little Rock. After the Court issued its
September 12, 1958 order upholding the court of appeals decision, Faubus
signed legislation calling for a public vote on whether to close Little Rock’s
public schools, and about two weeks later, just before the Court issued its
opinion ordering the desegregation plan to go forward, Little Rock voters
chose to close and privatize the public schools by a lopsided margin.338 The
day the Court issued its opinion declaring that Faubus must obey its doctrine
and orders, Faubus defiantly closed the Little Rock schools.339 They
remained closed for almost a year.340 During this time the various events
gave rise to litigation, in which the federal court held that the school closing
was unconstitutional and enjoined further action to frustrate integration,
moderates won control of the Little Rock School Board, and they
determined to reopen the schools on an integrated basis.341 Presidential
331.
332.
333.
334.
335.
336.
337.
338.
339.
340.
341.

Rogers, supra note 321, at 499.
Id. at 500.
Id.
Id. at 503.
Id. at 506–07.
Id. at 508.
Rogers, supra note 321, at 512.
FREYER, supra note 17, at 190, 203.
Id. at 203.
Id. at 209.
Id. at 209; see generally id. at 202–09.
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support was certainly helpful to the Court, but it was not sufficient to
integrate the public schools in Little Rock or elsewhere. Public acceptance
was even more critical, and Brown and Cooper clearly did not resonate with
the people of Little Rock in September 1958.
That would only occur as opponents of desegregation changed their
minds. After the Court issued its opinion in Cooper, Eisenhower issued a
statement of support.342 Its first paragraph contained his customary
invocation of judicial supremacy, but the second paragraph made a more
substantive argument based on equal justice for all.343 He said:
The Supreme Court, in its opinion rendered Monday, once again has
spoken with unanimity on the matter of equality of opportunity for
education in the nation’s public schools. It is incumbent upon all
Americans, public officials and private citizens alike, to recognize their
duty of complying with the rulings of the highest court in the land. Any
other course, as I have said before, would be fraught with grave
consequences to our nation.

Americans have always been proud that their institutions rest on the
concept of equal justice under law. We must never forget that the rights of
all of us depend upon respect for the lawfully determined rights of each of
us. As one nation, we must assure to all our people, whatever their color or
creed, the enjoyment of their Constitutional rights and the full measure of
the law’s protection. We must be faithful to our Constitutional ideals and go
forward in good faith with the unremitting task of translating them into
reality.344
Later that month, Eisenhower answered a question about civil rights to
a Republican group, saying that existing laws and decisions would “be
brought into effect only as the whole population, in its heart and in its
intelligence, understands that this principle of equality is important to the
United States and must be sustained.”345 These ideals would not “be
achieved in a moment, or even in a year[,]” but “the Republican Party will
always work for this ideal.”346
Eisenhower’s expressions recognized that public acceptance was a
necessary component of legal efficacy. That had been a long-standing belief

342. President’s Statement on Compliance with Court, supra note 330, at 722.
343. Id.
344. Id.
345. Radio and Newsreel Panel Discussion Sponsored by the National Republican
Committee in Chicago, 1958 PUB. PAPERS 780, 782 (Oct. 22, 1958) [hereinafter Radio and
Newsreel Panel].
346. Id.
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which he had previously articulated on other occasions.347 Then he had
coupled his defense of judicial supremacy with calls for recognition that
change in racial attitudes would occur gradually.348 Although he still said
that change would not occur “in a moment, or even a year[,]” he now
increasingly introduced some calls for racial justice.349
Eisenhower initially may have thought that emphasizing judicial
supremacy would be more persuasive with a Little Rock audience than
defending Brown or perhaps the former formulation was more comfortable
for him. Eisenhower often thought in terms of duty; as Brownell later put it,
“for Eisenhower, his duty, first and foremost, was to see that the
Constitution, and by implication the Supreme Court’s interpretation of it,
was upheld.”350 Perhaps Eisenhower exploited judicial supremacy since it
provided an alternative vocabulary which allowed him to avoid taking an
overt stand on Brown even while supporting its enforcement.351 Ultimately,
the argument also had to appeal to hearts, minds, and self-interest, and the
political branches needed to join the judiciary in public education and
action. The Court’s judgments are stated to be “universally prescriptive”
wrote Alexander Bickel, but they “actually become so only when they gain
widespread assent.”352 To bind non-parties they require “the assent and the
347. See, e.g., President’s October 3 News Conference, supra note 297, at 707 (“Now,
you will recall that I have here stated a belief that is the very core of my political thinking,
which is that it has got to be the sentiment, the good will, the good sense of a whole citizenry
that enforces law. In other words, you have got to win the hearts and minds of men to the
logic and the decency of a situation before you are finally going to get real compliance. Law
alone, as we found out in the prohibition experiment, does not cure some of the things it set
out to cure.”).
348. See, e.g., The President’s News Conference of October 30, 1957, 1957 PUB. PAPERS
774, 781 (Oct. 30, 1957) (“I personally believe this problem is never going to be solved
without patience and tolerance, consideration. We just simply cannot solve it completely just
by fiat or law and force. This is a deeper human problem than that. The South has lived for 56
years under a social order that was approved by the Supreme Court, and specifically with
respect to education, the theory of separate but equal facilities. Now they are asked suddenly
to consider that whole system unconstitutional and, naturally, this causes difficulties. Now,
with respect to the Little Rock situation, it seems to improve daily. I most devoutly hope and
pray that we soon can be confident enough of the situation that we can remove all Federal
force, and I hope that all future steps in this will be accomplished in a spirit of real
conciliation, and it does remain with us as a very urgent problem.”).
349. See, e.g., Radio and Newsreel Panel, supra note 345, at 782.
350. BROWNELL & BURKE, supra note 30, at 200.
351. Cf. Lain, supra note 26, at 1679 (“judicial supremacy is a political construct built
over time by the representative branches to further ends that they would find difficult, if not
impossible, to accomplish on their own.”); id. at 1681 (“judicial supremacy provides an
alternative forum for the resolution of conflicts that are too salient and divisive for the
political process to resolve.”); id. at 1683 (suggesting that political actors sometimes find
court orders useful for removing discretion from them).
352. ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS 90 (1978).
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cooperation, first of the political institutions, and ultimately of the
people.”353
VI. CONCLUSION
In Cooper, the Supreme Court responded to the defiance of Faubus and
other Southern politicians by insisting that it was the ultimate constitutional
interpreter and that its constitutional decisions bound state officials. The
Southerners’ challenge attracted the Court’s attention and, in responding, the
Court understandably reached back to an old chestnut like Marbury to try to
place the promise of Brown on the firmest legal foundation. For reasons
stated above, Marbury did not really provide the support to anchor the
sweeping claims the Court made regarding judicial supremacy.
Nonetheless, the Court’s claims of judicial supremacy deserve a greater
presumption of validity in a federalism context than in separation of powers
disputes. The constitutional imperatives that federal law is supreme and
should be interpreted uniformly require a national arbiter, and the Court is
often the institution which draws that assignment even if the constitutional
system must allow some leeway to criticize, test, and revise Supreme Court
doctrine even in a federalism context.354 The Court was encouraged to assert
its supremacy in constitutional interpretation by the recurring statements
Eisenhower and high officials in the Department of Justice made supporting
the idea that the Court’s conclusions in that regard bound other officials. In
this sense, Cooper provides something of a complementary bookend (or
case-end) to Marbury where the Court declined to issue the order consistent
with its resolution of the merits for lack of presidential support. In Cooper,
by contrast, Eisenhower’s support of judicial supremacy emboldened the
Court.
Yet even that was insufficient. Cooper illustrated the difficulty the
Court faces in umpiring a federalism dispute even with presidential support
that involves one of those relatively rare episodes that engage intense
emotional reactions. The effective functioning of the national government
often depends on the concerted action of multiple branches, especially when
the Court is called to resolve matters which are socially contentious. Even
so, Cooper teaches that in such situations, judicial pronouncements, even
353. Id.
354. Determining the exact parameters must await another day. Cf. Fallon, supra note
189, at 530. One might condemn the refusal of a government attorney to prosecute protesters
who prevented students from entering Central High because he disagreed with Brown even
while praising a hypothetical such official who refused to prosecute African-American
protesters who trespassed on school property to protest “separate but equal” before Brown
became law. Sometimes moral judgments may influence our attitude towards the willingness
to accept the applicability of Supreme Court doctrine on non-parties.
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when forcefully asserted in unanimous decisions, may only work gradual
change. Ultimately, sustainable constitutional change depends not simply on
workable constitutional doctrine supported by political officials, but also
public acceptance.

